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Abstract 
 
In 1795 the British took control of the Cape colony (South Africa) from the Dutch; and in 
1843 they exogenously changed the legal basis of landholding, giving more secure 
property rights to landholders. Since endowments and other factors were held constant, 
these changes offer clean tests of the effects on economic growth of colonial identity and 
secure property rights. The effects of both changes were immediate, positive and large. 
Other legal and institutional changes, such as the move to a common law system in 1827, 
had no such effects on economic growth. 
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“Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves 
secure in the possession of their property…” 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, book 5, chapter 3, paragraph 7. 
 
0. Introduction. Adam Smith was the first economist to emphasize the fundamental role 
that secure property rights play in stimulating economic activity. At the most basic level, 
Smith argued that secure property rights were both necessary and sufficient incentives for 
economic agents to produce more than they needed for bare subsistence (Wealth of 
Nations, book 4, chapter 5, paragraph 82): 
 
 “That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every man that he shall 
enjoy the fruits of his own labour is alone sufficient to make any country flourish…. The 
natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself 
with freedom and security is so powerful a principle that it is alone, and without any 
assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of 
surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too 
often incumbers its operations….” 
 
Many of the most important insights of Smith’s analysis follow from this basic tenet. For 
example, secure property rights can be achieved only when individuals come together to 
form a society. But a society cannot function without government and thus we have 
rationale for the existence of governments, which we commonly observe in the world. If 
a government is to provide security then it must hold a monopoly on the provision 
internal and external force (i.e. it must have a police and a military). It can maintain this 
monopoly only by being given the power to levy taxes in order to pay for the police and 
military. Yet the government itself could be a threat to personal property rights, since it 
has a monopoly on force, so Smith thus provides us with a rationale for separating the 
executive and judicial branches of the government. Once such a separation has occurred, 
it is feasible for the government to bind itself in law and this in turn permits financial 
development such as the issuance of government bonds. And so the argument is 
developed further and further, with the whole edifice built up from the foundation of 
secure property rights. 
Economists have long been persuaded of the fundamental importance of Smith’s 
insights. But we know that many other factors also affect the level of economic activity 
and it is appropriate to ask how quantitatively important are property rights in 
determining levels of income and economic growth. This has been the focus of a great 
deal of recent economic analysis and there is now a considerable body of research 
examining the role of property institutions – and the judicial systems that guarantee them  
– in promoting modern economic growth. Prominent contributions to this line of enquiry 
include the work on legal origins by Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei 
Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (hereafter LLSV) (1997, 1998, 1999); the work on 
finance and growth by Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (hereafter 
BDL) (2002a, 2002b, 2004); and the work on colonial origins by Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson and James Robinson (hereafter AJR) (2001, 2002, 2003). These papers 
are all in broad agreement: they offer strong empirical evidence showing that secure 
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property rights – typically measured as an index of freedom from expropriation – have a 
quantitatively important impact on the levels and growth rates of GDP and other 
variables such as the rate of investment. Unfortunately, these studies disagree on virtually 
everything else. For example, AJR undermine LLSV by specifically rejecting legal origin 
as an important cause of the variation in the security of property rights – according to 
AJR the variation is all down to colonial origins. By contrast, BDL support both LLSV 
and AJR by finding that both legal and colonial origins were important in generating 
increased investment and economic growth – but BDL then reject the argument proposed 
by both LLSV and AJR that secure property rights were the primary conduit through 
which this beneficial effect made itself felt, arguing instead that property rights were 
secondary to an efficient evolution of the legal system. 
 Virtually all the evidence presented by researchers in this area has been cross-
sectional. This is somewhat problematic for several reasons. First, there is always the fear 
an omitted variable might be driving the results. Indeed, this is exactly the criticism that 
AJR would make of the work of LLSV, since they find that adding colonial origins to the 
LLSV regressions reduces the explanatory power of legal origins to almost zero. This 
raises the obvious question of whether some other variable (not yet discovered) could in 
turn reduce the explanatory power of colonial origins to zero. Second, there is the 
problem that the cross-section contains only a limited amount of identifying variance that 
we can use to test between the competing hypotheses. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
it is difficult to get data for many countries (the cross-sections generally contain only 
around 60 observations), there are only a small number of legal origins (English, French 
and German) and these are highly correlated with a small number of colonial origins 
(British, French, German, Spanish and Dutch) (BDL, 2001, 30-1 and table 2).  
By contrast, this paper introduces a completely new body of time series evidence 
that gives us the identifying variance that we need to test empirically between the 
competing hypotheses. Our study is based on the European colony at the Cape of Good 
Hope, now known as South Africa. The Cape colony (as it was generally known) has the 
exceptional feature that it was a Dutch colony for 150 years and was then seized by the 
British in 1795 for geo-political reasons. Hence it offers a unique natural experiment, 
switching exogenously from Dutch to British colonial origins and from civil to common 
legal origins. It is also useful for our purposes that the change in legal origins occurred in 
two important stages. First, the common law and adversarial trials were introduced in 
1827; and, second, the nature of property rights changed in 1843. All these changes give 
us the identifying variance that we need in order to test empirically between the 
competing hypotheses of LLSV, BDL and AJR. Our construction of an entirely new data 
set on annual output and productivity for the period 1701 to 1875 gives us the data that 
we need to do the job. 
Before considering the new evidence we need to make a detailed comparison of 
the competing hypotheses in order to highlight their differences, since it is only by 
focusing on their differences that we can test between them empirically. It is to this task 
that we now turn. 
The modern property rights literature goes back to Friedrich A. von Hayek 
(1960), who stressed the importance to investors of secure property rights – and, in 
particular, legal checks on the ability of the government to expropriate investors. This 
line of argument was taken forward by Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989). They 
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argued that it was England’s Glorious Revolution of 1689 which established the primacy 
of Parliament over the monarchy and ensured that investors would not be subject to the 
arbitrary exercise of power. This in turn boosted investment and economic growth and 
led to the British industrial revolution in the eighteenth century. But it was LLSV (1998) 
who really took the analysis forward by offering the first modern empirical investigation 
of the relationship between legal origins and financial structure. 
The basic insight of LLSV is that the legal protection given to investors varies 
very considerably across countries. This stems from both the variation in nominal legal 
rights and the reliability with which those rights are enforced by the courts. For a sample 
of 49 countries LLSV collected data on a range of investor rights and the quality of legal 
enforcement and then took their empirical analysis in two directions.  
First, they show that the variation in legal protection for investors results in 
important variations in financial structure. For example, countries with poor legal 
protection for shareholders tend to have much more concentrated share ownership. 
Second, they trace the variation in investor rights back to the origins of the legal system. 
In particular, they draw a distinction between countries where the legal system is based 
largely on the “common law” and countries where it is based on the “civil law”. The 
common law system is built up organically from judicial rulings on individual cases and 
is essentially derived from English law, transplanted and later adapted in various British 
colonies.2 By contrast, the civil law system is built upon a rational, idealized view of 
economic relations and the morality that governs them; this view is then codified by the 
executive and handed down to be implemented by the judges. The civil law system is 
ultimately derived from Roman law but its modern incarnation derives from France and 
Germany, whose systems have been widely influential in other continental European 
countries and the colonies that they created. There is an important difference between 
French and German civil law regarding its ability to evolve over time. Napoleon 
conceived his code to be timeless because it was based on fundamental principles, 
whereas German legal scholars were open to the idea that new types of dispute would 
arise which required evolution of the legal code. LLSV find that legal origin is a very 
important determinant of the level of investor rights in different countries, with common 
law systems offering substantially the strongest investor rights, German civil law much 
weaker investor rights and French civil law the weakest investor rights. 
The distinction between French and German civil law systems is an important 
source of identifying variance that has been used by Levine, working with various co-
authors on a number of fronts. One of Levine’s goals has been to isolate the source of the 
benefits stemming from differences in legal origin. LLSV stress the importance of legal 
origin for the security of private property rights, whereas BDL stress its importance for 
the adaptability of the legal system. BDL (2002a) use four indicator variables to 
distinguish between the two hypotheses. The degree of power of the State over the 
judiciary is proxied by the length of tenure of Supreme Court judges and by the extent of 
Supreme Court power over the executive. The degree of legal adaptability is proxied by 
whether or not the law is built up from cases (judicial decisions) and by whether equity or 
statute are more commonly used as justification for new interpretations of the law. Using 
                                                 
2 Some of the literature refers to “British” legal origins. In fact, there is a substantial difference between 
English and Scottish law and it was English law that formed the basis of the legal systems of the British 
colonies. Hence we refer to “English” legal origins throughout  this paper. 
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a cross-section of 115 (sometimes 54) countries, they regress financial development 
indicators on the four legal indicators, both separately and together, in order to run a 
horse race and see which indicators win out. All the indicators are instrumented using 
legal origin. The general results are that both adaptability and State power are important, 
but adaptability is more robustly associated with superior financial intermediation and 
has a larger effect. Hence BDL find that English legal origin is the most beneficial for 
economic growth, German legal origin is the next most beneficial and French legal origin 
is substantially worse. BDL (2004) have reinforced their argument by using micro-level 
data to supplement their cross-country regression analysis. 
The literature was taken in a new direction by AJR (2001). AJR agree with LLSV 
that the key to modern economic development is secure property rights; hence the 
variable at the heart of their study is an index of protection against expropriation, which 
they use to explain cross-country variations in economic performance. But AJR strongly 
disagree with LLSV about the nature of successful institutions and what causes them to 
be created. 
AJR argue that the temperate zones were amenable to European settlement, and 
therefore European migrants went there to settle. These migrants demanded – and 
received – similar social, political and institutional structures to those that existed in the 
home country. Essentially, this meant that the local institutions were fairly democratic 
and effective. By contrast, some parts of the world were inimical to European settlement, 
particularly due to the prevalence of malaria and yellow fever, against which Europeans 
had no natural immunity. Given very high death rates of European migrants, the 
colonizers relied on local populations to provide labor. But the colonizers felt no 
obligation towards the local population and therefore set up very extractive institutions, 
such as slavery and authoritarian regimes. Thus the physical endowment of a colony, in 
terms of its disease environment, determined the nature of colonization. These extractive 
institutions, which offer little protection for private property, have persisted to the 
modern period in modified form and continue to exert a negative influence on 
contemporary investment and economic growth. 
 The AJR argument implies that the mortality rates of European settlers in the 
nineteenth century should be able to explain (at least some of) the variation that we 
observe in the effectiveness of modern institutions, which is a very useful property. We 
would like to be able to regress GDP on the effectiveness of local institutions but the 
effectiveness of institutions could be endogenous (i.e. rich countries can afford, or have a 
taste for, more effective institutions). But modern levels of GDP cannot possibly have 
any effect on settler mortality rates from the nineteenth century, so settler mortality rates 
can be used as an instrument for the effectiveness of local institutions. AJR construct a 
data set of 64 former colonies and use settler mortality to instrument for the index of 
investor protection, which they find to be statistically significant and explain a reasonable 
amount of the observed variation. Hence AJR conclude that the physical endowment of a 
colony, working through settler mortality and the institutions to which it gives rise, 
determines modern levels of GDP. 
The really interesting part of the AJR analysis is that they then introduce 
alternative explanations into their empirical estimation, in particular by using dummies 
for both legal origin and the identity of the colonial power. In sharp contrast to LLSV, 
they find that English legal origin has a negative overall effect on GDP (see panel A in 
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their table 5, where the French legal origin dummy is positive and significant and the 
excluded group is countries having English legal origins). They also find that having been 
a British colony – as opposed to having been a colony of any other non-French country – 
significantly reduces GDP (see panel A in their table 5, where the British colonial 
dummy is negative and significant; this should not be confused with panel B – the 
instrumenting equation – where the coefficient on the British colonial dummy is positive 
and significant). These are very surprising results. Various scholars, most recently Landes 
(1998), have highlighted the relatively benign nature of British colonization and the 
superior post-independence performance of British colonies. But AJR conclude that this 
is simply due to the fact that, on average, the British colonized areas that were amenable 
to European settlement. 
The AJR argument has been supported in several respects by Lakshmi Iyer, 
working with various co-authors. Iyer (2004) finds that modern agricultural productivity 
is higher in Indian districts that were ruled by the British, rather than native princes, up to 
1947. However, it turns out that this productivity gap arises from the superior fertility of 
districts that were annexed by the British and it disappears once she controls for this 
selection effect. This supports the AJR argument that the apparent superiority of British 
colonial performance was due merely to selection effects. The question then arises as to 
whether British colonial institutions had any permanent effects on India, as AJR would 
predict. Iyer finds that colonial institutions do indeed have permanent effects but the 
mechanism is different to the risk of expropriation index proposed by AJR. Iyer (2004), 
Iyer and Abhijit Banerjee (2005a, 2005b) and Iyer, Banerjee and Rohini Somanathan  
(2004) all find that there is a persistent colonization effect on the provision of public 
goods. Districts that were ruled by the British up to 1947 had a lower provision of public 
goods even in 1981 and 1991, and this was particularly marked in areas where the British 
had installed a class of landlords to collect government revenues.  
Another important contribution of BDL (2002b) has been to test the power of 
legal origins as an explanator of economic growth against alternative possible 
explanations, particularly the colonial origin view of AJR and the ethnic and religious 
fractionalization views of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Landes (1998) respectively. 
Using the same cross-section of 64 countries as AJR, BDL set out to explain the variation 
in a number of financial variables. They do this using legal origin, settler mortality rates 
and ethnic and religious fractionalization. The basic conclusion is that there is very little 
evidence in favor of the politics view but a fair amount of support for both the 
endowments and legal origin views. Quantitatively, the settler mortality variable turns out 
to be able explain more of the observed variation than does the legal origin variable. 
As a final twist, Naomi Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal (2004) have 
added to the legal origins debate by examining long run time series evidence. Much of 
the debate between LLSV and BDL revolves around the ease with which different legal 
systems are able to evolve efficiently over time. It would seem natural to approach this 
issue directly by considering the degree and the nature of the evolution over time of the 
legal systems in countries with different legal origins. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal take the 
polar cases of the US and France (common law versus static civil law) and consider two 
issues. First, how free were businessmen to choose the legal form of their business (i.e. 
what menu of options were available)? Second, how did this menu evolve over time in 
response to new economic conditions? 
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 Lamoreaux and Rosenthal find that the menu of organizational options in France 
encompassed that of the US (i.e. French entrepreneurs had available to them all the legal 
forms enjoyed by US entrepreneurs, and more). Also, the menu evolved equally quickly 
in France and the US. Hence Lamoreaux and Rosenthal manage to contradict both LLSV 
and BDL: the commercial law in common law countries offered no obvious channel by 
which it could beneficially affect economic relations, compared to its French civil law 
counterpart. Notice, however, that, whilst Lamoreaux and Rosenthal offer an interesting 
case study in comparative institutional history, they are unable to link their research 
directly to data on economic growth. For example, they do not show that changes in 
French and US law – or variations in the law across the US states – were associated with 
changes in output or productivity, or indeed in the rate of firm foundation.  
By contrast, in this paper we use the historical record to link changes in legal 
origin directly to changes in output and productivity growth. We are thus able to address 
two important issues that are being debated. The structure of our test is summarized in 
table 1 below.  
 
Table 1. Empirical predictions of positive growth factors. 
 Secure property 
rights 
Evolving legal 
system 
Geographical 
endowment 
Non-British 
colony 
LLSV Yes Maybe No No 
BDL Maybe Yes Yes No 
AJR Yes No Yes Yes 
 
First, BDL and LLSV disagree about the sources of the benefits of legal origin – 
was it the ability of the legal system to evolve or the security of property rights that 
mattered? We find that the rate of growth was unaffected by the introduction of common 
law and adversarial trials in 1827. By contrast, the improvement in the security of 
property rights in 1843 had an immediate and very large positive impact on the rate of 
growth. Hence LLSV are vindicated rather than BDL. Second, AJR and LLSV disagree 
as to whether the disease environment or legal origins were the primary determinant of 
the nature of institutions. Although the Cape colony changed the identity of its colonizing 
power and its legal origins, it did not change its geographical endowment and its disease 
environment. Therefore, in the context of the AJR model of colonization, the nature of 
institutions and the level of economic growth should have remained largely unaffected, 
with a slight negative effect as a result of Britain being the new colonial power. In fact, 
switching to British rule immediately resulted in a significant increase in the rate of 
growth. Changing the basis of property rights from the Dutch legal system to the English 
legal system in 1843 also greatly increased the rate of growth, so that by 1995 (when AJR 
observe the variation in GDP in their sample) the GDP at the Cape colony would have 
been five times higher as a result of the British takeover from the Dutch. Hence LLSV 
are vindicated rather than AJR. Therefore we find that LLSV emerge as the clear 
winners. First, it was legal origins (not colonial origins) that were the primary 
determinant of economic growth. Second, it was greater security of property rights that 
made the English legal origin important, not its ability to evolve over time. This is 
consistent with the recent work of Quy-Toan Do and Iyer (2004), which shows that the 
increased security of property rights in Vietnam following the introduction of the 1993 
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land law rapidly generated increases in cropped area. Our results are also very much in 
line with what Adam Smith would have predicted. 
 In the next section we briefly outline the historical development of the Cape 
colony, from its founding by the Dutch in the seventeenth century, through its seizure by 
the British in the early nineteenth century and up to the discovery of gold in 1867. We 
draw particular attention to the change in legal origins imposed by the British in 1827 and 
1843, considering exactly what it meant for economic relations within the colony and 
how we would expect it to impact economic performance. In section 2 we briefly 
introduce the data set that we have compiled from tax and census returns (a full 
exposition is given in the appendices). In section 3 we analyze the data and reveal the 
marked breaks in output and productivity growth that occurred in 1795 and 1843. Section 
4 concludes.  
 
1. Historical development of the Cape colony.  
 
1.1. Dutch rule, 1652-1795. The Dutch East India Company (hereafter “the Company”) 
was founded in 1602 to exploit the mercantile potential of the Far East, in particular to 
bring spices back to Europe where they could be sold at an enormous profit. The strategy 
was very successful and throughout most the seventeenth century the Dutch had a virtual 
monopoly on the spice trade, becoming very wealthy as a result. But the journey from 
Holland to the Far East was very long and ships needed to touch land in order to take on 
drinking water. Hence in 1652 the Company founded a town at the Cape of Good Hope 
on the southern tip of Africa; this became known as Cape Town and lies in modern South 
Africa. The Cape offered an extremely good natural harbor in a temperate zone (most of 
the rest of the journey took place in the tropics, where disease was a major killer of 
Europeans), along with good watering facilities. Also the land around the town was very 
fertile and in 1657 the Company permitted the Dutch colonists to settle outside the walls 
of the city. The hope of the Company was that farmers would bring the land into 
production and furnish a sufficient agricultural surplus that they could supply passing 
ships with grain, since if each ship carried less grain on its voyage – because it could be 
re-supplied at the halfway point – then there would be more space in the hold for valuable 
spices. 
 The government of the growing Cape colony was very repressive (Campbell, 
1795, pp. 137-40; Kersteins, 1795, pp. 168-71). The Company literally owned and 
controlled everything – the colony was a private enterprise and the colonists who lived 
and worked there were permitted to do so only by the good graces of the Company. The 
fiscal exactions of the administration were neither equitable nor predictable (Truter, 
1813, especially pp. 375-8, 382-3, 389) they were merely designed to maximize profits 
for the company. As Adam Smith noted (Wealth of Nations, book IV, chapter 7, 
paragraph 85): 
 
 “When those establishments [colonies] were effectuated, and had become so 
considerable as to attract the attention of the mother country, the first regulations which 
she made with regard to them had always in view to secure herself the monopoly of their 
commerce; to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their expence, and, 
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consequently, rather to damp and discourage then to quicken and forward the course of 
their prosperity.” 
 
It may seem strange that the colony was wholly owned by a private enterprise but, 
in fact, this was normal at the time. The French East India Company owned various 
colonies (such as the islands of Réunion and Mauritius). The British East India Company 
owned virtually all of Britain’s Far Eastern possessions (including Sri Lanka and large 
swathes of India and Pakistan) and the British Government replaced the British East India 
Company in governing the Far Eastern colonies only in 1858 after the Indian Mutiny. 
The Spanish colonies were also privately owned. They were not the possession of the 
Spanish state, they were the possession of the Spanish Crown (as indicated by the fact 
that revenues from the colonies went directly to the monarch). The Spanish 
administrative structure was actually quite similar to those of the Dutch, French and 
British East India Companies. The monarch personally appointed an administrative board 
called the Council of the Indies, which in turn appointed Viceroys to implement its 
policies locally. The only difference between the Spanish case and the Dutch, French and 
British East India Companies was that in Spain the monarch held 100 per cent of the 
shares. This arose quite naturally because the King of Spain had personally financed the 
expeditions that led to the creation of the colonies, whereas the other nations had 
financed their ventures through joint-stock companies. A final example is that of King 
Leopold II of Belgium, who personally owned the Belgian Congo in the late nineteenth 
century, financing its exploitation out of his personal fortune and reaping all the financial 
returns himself. Since the purpose of these colonies was to make money for shareholders, 
it is scarcely surprising that they were administered in an autocratic way.  
If colonies were owned privately by companies and individuals then we might ask 
how the legal origins of the possessor nations could be expected to influence the 
economic development of the colonies, either at the time or later. The simple answer is 
that the owners needed a legal system in order to facilitate economic relations and hence 
economic exploitation of their colony. It was only natural that they would take an off-the-
peg legal system that they already knew very well – that of their home country – and 
transplant it to the colony. Of course, they generally did not adopt the legal system of 
their home country in toto – they adapted it to local conditions, sometimes to local 
customs and always to their ultimate goals. This is exemplified by the Company’s use of 
land law in the Cape colony: the land law was essentially Dutch but with a slightly more 
repressive twist. In the seventeenth century there were several forms of land tenure in 
common use in the Netherlands (as there were in other countries, such as England) and 
these different forms of tenure gave the landholders more or less secure property rights. 
When the Company made land available in the Cape colony it employed various forms of 
traditional Dutch tenure but mostly it offered only the least secure form of landholding, 
which effectively completely blocked private land ownership (Duly, 1968, pp. 13-20). 
The most secure form of landholding in the Cape colony was eigendom, which 
was used mostly in Cape Town itself for houses and smallholdings. Eigendom was a 
form of outright ownership (i.e. freehold) but had stringent rules attached to it. In 
particular, the owner had to cultivate the land to its maximum capacity, pay one tenth of 
the produce to the government of the colony and allow (without compensation) any kind 
of road building that the government deemed necessary on the land. Violation of any of 
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these obligations made the land subject to forfeiture. These were unusual and rather 
draconian conditions to place on freehold landownership. The second most secure form 
of landholding was quitrent, which was introduced in 1732. The government leased out 
plots of land for periods of 15 years in return for a rent of 2 skillings per morgen per year. 
The leases could be renewed with the agreement of both parties; if the lease was not 
renewed then the government paid for any land improvements made by the landholder in 
the lifetime of the lease. It is interesting to note that his form of tenure was commonly 
used in English agriculture at this time and has been highlighted, both by contemporaries 
and modern scholars, as one of the major reasons for the success of English agriculture.3 
Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations, book 3, chapter 2, paragraph 15) argued that: 
 
“When such farmers have a lease for a term of years, they may sometimes find it 
for their interest to lay out part of their capital in the further improvement of the farm; 
because they may sometimes expect to recover it, with a large profit, before the 
expiration of the lease…. There is, I believe, no-where in Europe, except in England, any 
instance of the tenant building upon the land of which he had no lease, and trusting that 
the honour of his landlord would take no advantage of so important an improvement. 
Those laws and customs so favourable to the yeomanry have perhaps contributed more to 
the present grandeur of England than all their boasted regulations of commerce taken 
together.” 
 
Notice that much of the security enjoyed by the yeomanry (the class of small farmers) 
was based on customs (i.e. precedents that had become enshrined in the common law). 
The long length of the leases and the promise of compensation for unexhausted 
investments gave the farmer good incentives to make investments in the land (such as 
installing drainage, putting up buildings, using long-lived fertilizers and so on).  
Several further points are worth emphasizing. First, the English system was 
considerably better in a number of ways than the Dutch system used in the Cape colony. 
In England the farmers were not holding land from the government but from local private 
landowners; this meant that the farmers had recourse to an independent judiciary in the 
case of any land dispute. This was not true in the Cape colony, where the landowner (i.e. 
the Company) was also the judiciary. As Smith further argues (Wealth of Nations, book 
5, chapter 1, paragraph 68): 
 
“When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that 
justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called polities. The persons 
entrusted with the great interests of the state may, even without any corrupt views, 
sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man. 
But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, 
the sense which he has of his own security.” 
 
Second, the English system was superior also because the annual rents varied from place 
to place and time to time, whereas in the Cape colony they were completely fixed at 2 
skillings per morgen. We would generally expect flexible prices to result in economic 
decisions that were more allocatively and productively efficient. For example, 
                                                 
3 British agriculture was extremely productive by international standards – see Wrigley (1987). 
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presumably there was land that would have been worth cultivating at an annual rent of 1 
skilling but not 2 skillings, so a sub-optimal amount of land was in production in the 
Cape colony. Third, the English system was superior also because it was based on written 
contracts over surveyed areas of land, whereas the Dutch system was based on verbal 
contracts over unsurveyed areas of land. This was open to obvious abuse. Fourth, the 
quitrent system was virtually never used in Cape colony. In 1797 there were only 35 
cases of quitrent tenure out of the tens of thousands of cases of land tenure. Thus the land 
tenure system that came closest to the English system (even though it remained 
considerably inferior in many dimensions) was almost never used on the ground. 
 By far the most common form of tenure offered in the Cape colony, accounting 
for 80 per cent of all the land held by the grace of the Company, was the loan-place 
system. This was a form of annual rent fixed at 12 rixdollars per year (24 rixdollars per 
year from 1732 onwards) plus an annual stamp duty of 6 rixdollars per year. The 
organization and administration of the loan-place system was virtually non-existent. 
There were no maps of land outside Cape Town and the land was almost totally 
unsurveyed. An applicant would ask the local administrator (the “landdrost”) to take out a 
loan-place on an unoccupied piece of land. This was very often centered on some kind of 
water source, since water was generally in short supply (Alexander, 1815, pp. 246-7). 
The plot was set out by walking for 30 minutes in each direction (north, south, east and 
west) and placing occasional markers. The resulting area was generally expected to 
contain around 9 square miles of land (3000 morgen). The local administrator was then 
supposed to transmit to Cape Town the farmer’s request to take out the loan-place, 
although frequently this was not done. Moreover, since there was no land survey and no 
written contract there was effectively no way that the Company bureaucrats in Cape 
Town could make any kind of meaningful registration. The loan-place farmers generally 
enjoyed de facto long term tenure, in that the government very rarely refused to renew a 
lease, but their de jure tenure was always limited to one year and this generated 
considerable uncertainty. One of the locals claimed that: “When the Company discovered 
that the farmers grew slack in the payment of their taxes, they without hesitation put their 
property to sale, seized upon their wagons, utensils of husbandry and cattle.” (Kerstein, 
1795, p. 171). Whilst persistent non-payment of taxes would ultimately result in property 
seizure in England, it would be preceded by a lengthy judicial process. By contrast, the 
Dutch farmers at the Cape were extremely vulnerable to direct government action, such 
as immediate eviction, because they were on one-year leases and the government was 
their landlord. 
 An important point to note is that the loan-places were not contiguous. Instead 
they were scattered over large areas in response to topography and local water sources. 
One effect of this was that most loan-place farmers were able to cultivate or graze an area 
that was much larger than that to which they were entitled. Contemporary estimates 
suggest that loan-place farmers typically cultivated around 75 per cent more land than 
their legal entitlement (Duly, 1968, p. 16). There was no one in situ to monitor their 
activities – no government and no neighbors. Hence much of the land that was cultivated 
was held illegally. 
 In fact, illegal land occupation (squatting) was by far the most common form of 
landholding in the Cape colony. Reyburn (1934) shows that in Craddock District in 1812 
only 38 per cent of families had any kind of legal recognition of their landholdings. On 
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the outer fringes on the colony near Kaffaria only 18 per cent of landholdings were 
legally recognized. This situation arose partly through migration. More and more farmers 
were fanning out from Cape Town in the west and traveling further eastwards in search 
of unoccupied land. After some years – when the new fringe area was sufficiently 
populated – the Company would bother to create an additional official district and 
appoint a local administrator. In the meantime, the land was being held illegally. 
 The irony of the situation was that the Company maintained draconian de jure 
rights over all land because it wanted to have total control over the colonists and their 
produce; the Company wanted to be able to extract the whole surplus from agricultural 
production. But, precisely because the Company was so extractive, the colonists 
continually moved further and further away from Cape Town; the absence of local 
administration in these far-flung areas then meant that the Company had absolutely no de 
facto control over the colonists and extracted very little. The unintended consequence of 
this train of events was that the vast majority of the farmers in the Cape colony had no 
legal right to hold the land that they were cultivating (D’Escury, p. 328). Adam Smith 
presciently summarized the results of such a policy (Wealth of Nations, book III, chapter 
3, paragraph 12): 
 
 “Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security of 
individuals, were, in this manner, established in cities at a time when the occupiers of 
land in the country were exposed to every sort of violence. But men in this defenceless 
state naturally content themselves with their necessary subsistence, because to acquire 
more might only tempt the injustice of their oppressors. On the contrary, when they are 
secure of enjoying the fruits of their industry, they naturally exert it to better their 
condition, and to acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniences and elegancies of 
life.” 
 
The prediction that insecure property rights would result in suboptimal levels of 
investment is supported by the qualitative evidence from the Cape colony. The early 
British observers noted that the Dutch worked the land using insufficient quantities of 
very outdated capital (Gourlay, 1819, pp. 153-60). 
 
1.2. British rule, 1795-1842. The Company continued to rule the Cape colony 
uninterrupted until 1795, when Britain entered the scene. During the late eighteenth 
century Britain had come to dominate the Far East militarily and politically, gaining 
direct or indirect control over large areas of the Indian sub-continent and diverting much 
of the trade in exotic goods from Dutch to English ports. The British ships used Cape 
Town as a stopover and the British became increasingly worried that if the Netherlands 
supported France in a war against Britain – as they had in 1780-3 during the latter part of 
the American War of Independence – then Britain could effectively be cut off from her 
rich Far Eastern possessions. The obvious solution was for the British to seize control of 
the Cape colony in the event of war, and this is what happened in 1795 after the Dutch 
aligned themselves with the French.4 
                                                 
4 The Dutch decision to align themselves with the French was not entirely voluntary. The Netherlands was 
invaded by an army from Revolutionary France and the rulers were overthrown, to be replaced by a 
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 The British were unsure what to do with the Cape colony once they had it. In the 
event that peace was made, it seemed likely that the British would have to return the 
Cape colony to the Dutch as a part of any overall agreement. The Cape colony was one of 
the Netherlands’ most important overseas possessions and it seemed unlikely that France 
and the Netherlands would be willing to sign any peace deal that did not include its 
restitution to the Dutch. (France, too, had colonies in the Indian Ocean, such as 
Madagascar and the Seychelles, and so would clearly be much happier if the Cape colony 
were safely back in the hands of its Dutch ally). Hence in 1795 the British simply wanted 
to keep the colony as a stopover to the Far East and had no interest in its long term 
development. Moreover, Britain did not want to have to pour military resources into the 
colony whilst it was hard-pressed elsewhere and therefore it was trying to avoid 
antagonizing the Dutch colonists, who had already risen in revolt against the new 
government in 1795. Hence the explicit instructions from the Secretary of State for War 
and the Colonies, Henry Dundas, to the new governor in 1796 were to administer the 
Cape colony “in conformity to the laws and instructions that subsisted under the ancient 
government of the said settlement” (Duly, 1968, p. 23). In consequence, the British left 
the administration of the Cape colony virtually unaltered during their tenure, simply 
replacing the Dutch governor with a British governor who administered the colony 
through the existing cadre of Dutch staff.  
It is worth noting that one of the British governors, Sir George Yonge, strongly 
disagreed with this policy. He felt that major reforms were needed in the colony to ensure 
its future prosperity and that they should be undertaken immediately. In particular, Yonge 
believed that the loan-place system gave insufficient security of tenure and was too open 
to government interference and abuse. Yonge proposed instead that all land be let on 21-
year inheritable leases (as was common in England) and he sent a detailed report to this 
effect to Dundas. In fact, Dundas himself was about to be replaced by Lord Hobart. When 
Hobart later read the report his view was that: 
 
 “Sir George Yonge’s observations on the enormous extent of the loan lands and 
the evils necessarily resulting from the defects of the system according to which they are 
at present managed, appear to me to be very just, and however applicable that system 
might have been in the early periods of the settlement of the colony it must now become 
extremely detrimental to its increasing prosperity.” 
 
But Dundas had already blocked any kind of reforms along the lines that Yonge was 
proposing. One of Dundas’ last acts as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was to 
recall Yonge to London in disgrace and replace him with Dundas’ own nephew, Major 
General Francis Dundas, who could be relied upon to implement his uncle’s policy of no 
reform. 
 The British expectations about the shortness of their tenure of the Cape colony 
were proved to be correct when it was restored to the Dutch in 1802 by the peace treaty 
of Amiens. Interestingly, the Dutch changed the administration of the colony as soon as 
they retook possession in 1803 (Walker, 1957). By this time the Netherlands had become 
the Batavian Republic and the old (and somewhat inefficient) government bodies had 
                                                                                                                                                 
republican government. The country was then renamed the Batavian Republic until 1806, when Napoleon 
made his brother Louis the new King of Holland. 
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been abolished. The Dutch East India Company went bankrupt in 1799 and it was 
replaced by a state body, the Council for the Asiatic Possessions. The Council appointed 
one of its members, Jacob Abraham de Mist, to be Commissary-General of the Cape 
colony. He spent 18 months there and, together with the Jan Willem Janssens, attempted 
to make the administration less repressive. One of his proposals was to change loan-place 
tenure into freehold tenure (i.e. outright ownership on the part of the farmer). De Mist 
believed that this would induce the farmers to undertake more investment, increase 
production and regenerate the colony’s internal markets (Duly, 1968, p. 37). 
Unfortunately, this proposal had to be scrapped when some of the high-level local 
administrators – notably Van Ryneveld, the Chief Judge, President of the Council of 
Judicature and member of the Political Council – strenuously objected to giving up any of 
the government’s rights over the land. 
In any case, the Dutch reforms were largely moot. War broke out again in 1803 
and the British reoccupied the Cape colony in January 1806. Again, it was unclear how 
long the British occupation would last and the British governor was again informed by 
London that “…the temporary administration of justice and police in the settlement shall 
as nearly as circumstances will permit be exercised by you in conformity to the laws and 
institutions that subsisted under the ancient government of the said settlement…”. This 
state of uncertainty continued until 1815, when the Cape colony was ceded permanently 
to Britain as part of the peace treaty of Vienna. In the intervening nine years the 
administration of the land tenure system had become worse rather than better. The first 
governor, Lord Caledon, realized that the whole system was a mess, stemming both from 
the absence of a land survey (which made enforceable contracts virtually impossible) and 
the nature of the tenures that were granted. He therefore decided to stop awarding any 
kind of legal tenure and instead wrote to the government in London for advice – which 
they took two years to provide. In the meantime farmers simply squatted on the land that 
they wanted to register and started production in the hope that they would be given tenure 
at a later date (Duly, 1968, pp. 36-44). 
 The new governor who arrived in 1809, Sir John Cradock, was in the same mold 
as Sir George Yonge. His great desire was to replace the “inadequate and inferior” Dutch 
civil law system with one based on English legal principles (Duly, 1968, p. 50). As a part 
of this plan he favored granting land in freehold tenure. Prohibited by London from 
making any such radical changes, he instead he decided to make all new tenures under 
the traditional Dutch perpetual quitrent system (i.e. 15-year leases) but with the 
innovation that the annual rents would vary according to the location and fertility of the 
land. This made obvious economic sense and should have improved the efficiency of land 
use. As well as making all new land grants in the form of quitrents, Cradock also 
encouraged the conversion of loan-place tenures into quitrent tenures in order to increase 
the security of tenure. By 1821 82 per cent of loan-place farmers had applied to convert 
their loan-place tenures into quitrent tenures (Duly, 1968, p. 68). 
Unfortunately, Cradock’s scheme did not function very well. In 1814, as his 
scheme was finally coming into full operation, Cradock was replaced as Governor by 
Lord Charles Somerset. At the same time a new Inspector of Government Lands and 
Buildings was appointed, Charles D’Escury, who was very strong-minded and not afraid 
to hold his ground against (what he perceived to be) corruption and vested interest. 
Overall this greatly hindered the implementation of Cradock’s scheme.  
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First, the rents to be set on new tenures were recommended by local assessors. 
But D’Escury believed that the assessors set the rents much too low and he therefore 
greatly delayed the granting of titles and sometimes simply refused to grant them. 
D’Escury spent 14 years as Inspector of Government Lands and Buildings and made a 
total of 2 061 grants of land (Duly, 1968, p. 73); but by 1824 there were already more 
than 5 000 requests outstanding! At D’Escury’s rate of 150 grants per annum, it would 
have taken him 33 years to clear the backlog, assuming that no new applications arrived. 
Similarly, by 1823 there were 1 300 applications outstanding to convert loan-place 
tenures into quitrent tenures; at D’Escury’s rate of 40 conversions per annum, this could 
also be expected to take 33 years. The interminable application delays once again drove 
the farmers back to a policy of squatting. At the same time, Lord Somerset and D’Escury 
found squatting unacceptable and the law was changed such that anyone who squatted on 
a piece of land automatically had their tenure application for it rejected (Alexander, 1814, 
p. 117-8). Obviously, this compounded the squatting problem.  
Second, after the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815 there was a period of generally 
falling prices which badly affected farmers in the Cape colony and elsewhere. Many of 
the farmers in the Cape colony went into rent arrears and petitioned the Governor to have 
their rents reduced, which would make economic sense if their rents had previously been 
set at market value. However, this process was mismanaged. The Governor and D’Escury 
disagreed over whether rent reductions were appropriate, with the Governor granting 
them against opposition from D’Escury. Notice that this problem was exacerbated by the 
absence of a private rental market for land (which had never developed owing to the 
government’s refusal to sell off any land in freehold). The absence of a rental market 
meant that there were no rental price signals and therefore it was extremely difficult for 
the government in Cape Town to know whether local rent reductions were warranted or 
not. The Governor also made a tactical error. When he granted rent reductions he made it 
retroactive on rent arrears – so farmers had an obvious incentive to go into arrears until 
they could claim a rent reduction. Finally, the relevant government office was 
overwhelmed with requests for rent reductions and did not have the proper resources to 
consider them on their merits. 
 Lord Somerset and D’Escury both left office in 1828. Thereafter there was a 
considerable improvement in the efficiency of government in general and the granting of 
land tenure in particular. The new Surveyor General, Major Charles Michell, reorganized 
the land department and managed to increase the speed at which it worked, granting 
quitrent tenures for nearly 80 000 acres per annum in the period 1828-34 (Duly, 1968, p. 
132). A further reorganization and some increased staffing raised this rate to nearly 3 
million acres per annum in the period 1835-44. The interesting point to note, however, is 
that there was no correlation between the issuing of quitrent tenures and increases in the 
quantity of arable land in production. In fact, in the period 1835-44 the arable acreage 
was falling rather than rising. This suggests that, even when the quitrent system worked 
and it was possible for the farmer to get tenure, this type of tenure was not sufficient to 
encourage them to undertake arable production, which required investment in fixed 
capital. Instead they preferred to maintain their emphasis on pastoral production, which 
required investment only in circulating capital. 
 A Parliamentary inquiry, analyzing the data available up to 1844, summarized the 
situation very neatly: “The climate, soil, and pastures of the Cape of Good Hope extend 
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to this extensive colony nearly all the natural advantages; but it has neither increased in 
population, nor prospered in wealth or trade, in the same progressive rate as the distant 
colonies of Australia, or even that of Port Phillip [Melbourne].” (British Parliamentary 
Papers, 1849, p.363). 
 There is one further important point to note about British rule in this period. 
Although the land alienation system functioned poorly, this did not arise from any British 
animosity towards the Dutch farmers and agriculture in the Cape. One the contrary, the 
British had taken to heart Adam Smith’s exhortation (Wealth of Nations, book V, chapter 
2, paragraph 47): 
 
 “The principal attention of the sovereign ought to be to encourage, by every 
means in his power, the attention both of the landlord and of the farmer, by allowing both 
to pursue their own interest in their own way and according to their own judgment; by 
giving to both the most perfect security that they shall enjoy the full recompense of their 
own industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive market for every part of their 
produce, in consequence of establishing the easiest and safest communications both by 
land and by water through every part of his own dominions as well as the most 
unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of other princes.” 
 
The British implemented many reforms which could be expected to lead to increases in 
output. They awarded prizes to farmers who offered examples of agricultural best 
practice; they lowered tariffs on agricultural imports into Britain from the Cape (Irving, 
1817, p. 291); they promoted the local Board of Agriculture (Alexander, 1812b, pp. 1-3); 
they improved the road system (Alexander, 1812a, pp. 251-2); they set up a new 
agricultural market (Cradock, Truter and Van Nuldt Onkruydt, 1812, pp. 387-90); and 
they sought to make the tax system more equitable and predictable (Truter, 1813, 
especially p. 399).  
The British also reformed the law in several important respects. One of the most 
important pieces of legislation was the so-called “Hottentot Law” of 1809 which gave 
much greater rights to the indigenous population. Although there were many slaves in the 
colony, mostly imported from other parts of Africa, there was also a large and nominally 
free indigenous population. However, the white farmers held all the political and 
economic power and the rights of the indigenous population were greatly circumscribed 
almost to the point of slavery. They had no formal labor contracts setting out their rights, 
obligations and wages and they were also bound to remain in particular localities (which 
effectively meant that there was only very limited competition amongst potential 
employers). The Hottentot Law made labor contracts compulsory and permitted the 
indigenous population to sue their employers for breach of contract. It is noteworthy that 
the British also actively promoted the implementation of the new law by sending a British 
judge to tour rural areas in 1812 to hear such cases. It was also intended in 1809 to permit 
the free movement of labor but this clause was cut from the final draft of the law owing 
to strenuous opposition from the Dutch farmers. Free movement had to wait until 1828, 
when the government also granted complete emancipation of all Cape tribes. Slaves (i.e 
the non-indigenous black population) were emancipated in 1833, when a general Act was 
passed emancipating slaves everywhere in the British Empire. 
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Another important raft of reforms arrived in 1827. The British introduced the 
adversarial system of court proceedings, rather than relying on an investigating 
magistrate. They also introduced the common law notion that legal decisions should be 
based on precedent as well as statute. Initially, the precedents would be those based on 
local custom (i.e. the Dutch civil law system) but over time the law was free to evolve in 
response to new situations. These reforms were implemented by a judiciary trained in 
England. 
 
1.3. British rule after 1842. In the 1820s a British politician, Edward Wakefield, 
analyzed the economic structure of several of the world’s frontier regions, including 
Australia and the US. Wakefield was particularly impressed with the US land law of 
1820 by which the government alienated land to private individuals (Wakefield, 1829, 
1833). The land was divided into freehold tracts of not less than 80 acres and sold by 
public auction with a reserve price of $1.25 per acre. Wakefield believed that this supply 
of freehold land encouraged settlers into the region and gave them the right incentives to 
invest and create self-sustaining communities. The parallel between the US frontier and 
the British imperial frontier in South Africa and Australia was self-evident: as Wakefield 
put it, “What is a new state formed in the western deserts of America, if it be not a new 
colony?” He therefore proposed the same system for the British empire. This approach 
was recommended by House of Commons in 1836 (British Parliamentary Papers, 1836) 
and adopted in 1839 by the new Colonial Secretary, Lord John Russell. Henceforth all 
land in the Cape was to be sold in freehold by public auction with a reserve price of two 
shillings and six pence per acre. 
 Implementing the auction scheme in the Cape proved to be a difficult and drawn-
out process. Governor Napier and Surveyor General Michell were both strongly against 
the scheme. One reason for their opposition is that there were still thousands of 
outstanding claims made under the old scheme of quitrent tenures – some of which had 
been waiting 20 years for approval – and Napier and Michell felt that it was only 
reasonable that these claims should be dealt with before any new system was introduced. 
The colonial government did not have the administrative resources to implement both 
schemes at the same time. A second reason for their opposition was that South Africa was 
not a virgin territory like the western US. As a result, much of the land that had yet to be 
alienated was interspersed with tracts that were already occupied and which controlled 
the only local water sources. Hence these unoccupied tracts were really useful only to the 
farmers who occupied the adjacent lands and it was not clear that any kind of meaningful 
public auction could be implemented. Napier and Michell stalled the introduction of the 
new scheme for four years and continued alienating land under their previous quitrent 
scheme. Ultimately, this led to Napier’s replacement as governor by Sir Peregrine 
Maitland in 1844. Thereafter the auction scheme was implemented for almost all new 
grants of land, as required by London, and also the old quitrent tenures were gradually 
converted into freehold tenures (the quitrent holders could do this by paying fifteen 
years’ quitrent to the government in one lump sum). Finally, after 50 years of British rule, 
the colonial Dutch system of land holding was replaced by the British system and Cape 
farmers gained freehold property rights over their land. 
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 The issue that we need to address is what effect these changes in colonizing 
power, legal procedure and property rights had on output and productivity in the Cape. 
We now turn to an empirical analysis of this question. 
 
2. Data on output and productivity in the Cape colony. We would expect arable 
agriculture to be particularly adversely affected by institutional problems such as insecure 
property rights, arbitrary taxation and repressive government. This is because it requires a 
considerable amount of fixed investment in items such as buildings, fencing, drainage 
and irrigation. Efficient production also requires a considerable amount of investment in 
capital goods that are movable only with considerable difficulty, such as ploughs and 
reaping and threshing machines. This immobility means that the government can always 
find arable farmers and make them obey the law of the land. By contrast, pastoral 
production in the Cape required no fixed investment at all. The farmers would simply 
round up their cattle and drive them to the grazing areas that were in the best condition; 
the condition of the grazing areas was a function of recent rainfall patterns so the cattle 
herds were constantly on the move. This made it relatively easy to avoid government 
regulations and exactions. Given that we expect the nature of the law and institutions and 
the security of property rights to affect primarily the level of fixed investment, it clearly 
makes sense to look for the effect of legal and institutional changes in the output and 
efficiency of arable agriculture rather than pastoral agriculture. Therefore all of the 
analysis that follows relates to arable production.5 
The data available for the Cape colony are not particularly good by modern 
standards but they are exceptionally good by the standards of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. This stems from the fact that the colony was a private enterprise and 
the Dutch East India Company administered the territory more like a commercial venture 
than a country. The Company wanted to make as much profit as possible from its colony 
and this required decent bookkeeping. Since the Company was full of bookkeepers, 
skilled labor was not in short supply for this task.  
 The basic data source for the period of Dutch rule (1701-1795) are the annual 
Opgaaf returns, which reported data on most of the important economic variables. First, 
we have an annual population return (which is unheard-of for the eighteenth century) 
broken down into many different categories: European and non-Europeans, adults and 
children, men and women, freemen and slaves. Since the population was initially very 
small and migration was easy to monitor (ships calling at the Cape numbered tens per 
annum) it seems likely that the population data are accurate.  
                                                 
5 There is a second reason to avoid an empirical consideration of pastoral agriculture: the data are 
extremely poor. This is partly because the government did not collect data on the animal population. But it 
is also more fundamental than that. One of the variables that we are going to consider is the amount of land 
in production. With arable agriculture the “amount of land in production” is a concrete concept, whereas 
with quasi-nomadic cattle farmers it is almost meaningless. The Cape cattle farmers used not only their 
own quitrent land but also the unclaimed land around it (i.e. they squatted on large areas of land). 
Moreover, the land that they used changed from year to year in response to annual fluctuations in rainfall. 
If an area of land was grazed only in very dry years, say once every ten years, then does this land count as 
being in pastoral production? What about if the land is grazed only once, ever? Or should we count only 
land that was grazed in a particular year? This latter, restrictive definition would clearly drastically 
underestimate the amount of land used regularly in cattle farming. Moreover, there are absolutely no data 
available on the amount of land grazed each year. Hence it makes more sense to undertake an empirical 
analysis of arable agriculture only. 
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Second, we have annual data on the total input and output quantities of the major 
field crops – wheat, barley and rye – declared by farmers for the purposes of taxation. 
Output estimates made on the basis of tax returns are, of course, likely to be biased 
downwards and the Company was aware of this fact. On several occasions they made 
more intensive surveys in order to be able to gauge the level of underreporting; they did 
this either by sending inspectors directly out to the farms or by putting an inspection team 
on the road to Cape Town to record the number of wagonloads of grain going market 
(Cape Town provided the only market in the colony). We used both of these sources, 
together with estimates of consumption, to reflate the Opgaaf grain returns and thereby 
offset the underreporting by farmers. A full exposition of the procedure is given in the 
appendix. The main point to note is that our estimates of total output for the late 
eighteenth century are rather higher than previous estimates, which tends to push up our 
estimates of output growth under Dutch rule and reduce our estimates of growth under 
British rule. 
Third, we know the quantity and value of imports and exports of all agricultural 
goods. As with the data on migrants, these data should be very accurate because shipping 
was easily and closely monitored – it was, after all, the raison d’être of the Cape colony. 
The trade data are useful for two reasons. First, once we know the trade balance we can 
estimate how much agricultural produce was available for domestic consumption; we can 
use this as a check on our production data. Second, the Opgaaf does not report the market 
prices of agricultural goods. We have therefore used export prices when valuing outputs. 
 The British were also keen to learn about their new colony in order to better 
exploit it. London was particularly adamant that the costs of the military occupation 
should be met by tax revenues raised in the colony. Unfortunately, the British were less 
effective than the Dutch at collecting both data and taxes. There were no data collected 
during the first occupation (1796-1803) and it is only from 1806 onwards that systematic 
data series are again available. For the period 1806-23 we again have annual data on 
population broken down into numerous categories. We also have data on the amount of 
grain sown and reaped. There are no data on prices so we have simply linearly 
interpolated between 1795 and 1836. 
 The British stepped up their data collection efforts from 1833 onwards and there 
are good data available annually for the years 1833, 1836-42 and 1852-4. These data 
include population (by district) and the acreages, yields, outputs and prices of all the 
major field crops (wheat, barley, oats, rye, hay, maize, peas, beans and potatoes). In this 
period Britain began collecting similar information for large areas of the empire in order 
that London could make more informed policy decisions about issues such as migration. 
It seems that the imperial administrators – many of whom were army officers – took 
these duties very seriously and it is likely that these data are fairly accurate.  
 Unfortunately, data collection seems to have lapsed in the Cape colony after 1854, 
which is surprising because it continued in other, comparable colonies such as Canada 
and Australia. But in the 1860s the imperial administration again stepped up a gear and 
began requiring a decadal census to be taken for the whole empire. In the Cape colony 
the census recorded not only population but also a wealth of data on agricultural 
production, including the acreages, yields, outputs and prices of all the major field crops. 
Hence we have two very reliable benchmarks for 1865 and 1875. 
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 From the preceding discussion we can see that we have reasonable data on 
agricultural outputs. Unfortunately, we have much less data on agricultural inputs, 
particularly for the years 1701-1823, which makes productivity estimation extremely 
difficult. With regard to land, for the years 1701-1823 we do not have direct information 
on the acreage in production, only the output of each crop. The best that we can do is to 
back out estimates of the amount of land under each crop by dividing the total output of 
each crop by an estimate of the yield per acre of each crop. Fortunately, the observed 
crop yields between 1833 and 1875 show no trend, either upwards or downwards, so we 
have simply taken the average yield of each crop for 1833-42 and assumed that yields 
were the same in earlier years. With regard to labor, the story is similar. We have 
excellent population returns for the years 1701-1823 but we have little information 
regarding the division of labor inputs between sectors. Over time, the Cape colony was 
becoming relatively less dependent on agriculture and this can been seen in the 
downward trend of the proportion of adult males who were working in agriculture 
between 1833 and 1842. We extrapolated this trend back to 1806 and then estimated the 
adult male population in agriculture by multiplying the data series on adult male 
population by the data series on the proportion working in agriculture. We assumed that 
prior to 1806 the proportion was constant at its 1806 value (76 per cent). With regard to 
capital, there are essentially no data at all available and in consequence we have not 
attempted to make any calculations at all concerning total factor productivity. The data 
situation is summarized in table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. Data available on agricultural inputs and outputs at the Cape, 1701-1875. 
Years Population % Males in 
Agriculture 
Output Prices Land in 
Production 
Crop 
Yields 
1701-95 Yes Estimated Yes Yes Estimated Estimated 
1806-23 Yes Estimated Yes Estimated Estimated Estimated 
1833-54 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1865-75 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes. For an exhaustive discussion of the estimation procedures employed, see the appendix. 
 
The data constraints mean that overall we can offer reasonable estimates of output 
and acreage (both in toto and broken down by crop) and also of labor productivity. These 
are the series that we analyze in the next section. 
 
3. Legal and institutional changes and economic growth. There are four years in 
which we might expect break points to occur in the output and productivity series of the 
Cape colony. The first candidate is 1795, when the British first seized control of the Cape 
and replaced the repressive Dutch administration with a somewhat less repressive (and 
almost certainly less effective) British administration. At this point we might expect the 
farmers to have increased production because they were probably able to hold onto a 
higher proportion of their output. The second candidate is 1814, when the Cape was 
definitively ceded to Britain. The administration clearly became less repressive at this 
point. The British began to replace loan-places with quitrent tenures and were keen to 
encourage the expansion of arable agriculture through improved institutions, such as the 
Cape Town market, the Board of Agricultural Improvement and the Hottentot Law. This 
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was generally a period when a benevolent regime was operating within the Dutch legal 
framework. The third candidate is 1827, when the British introduced adversarial court 
proceedings and the common law. We might expect output and productivity to rise as the 
legal system evolved to regulate economic transactions more efficiently. The fourth 
candidate is 1843, when the British implemented the new imperial land policy in the 
Cape and began selling off new land in freehold and converting quitrents into freehold. 
We would expect this to lead to increased fixed capital investment, such as fencing and 
irrigation, which would bring more land into production. And we might also expect to see 
increased investment in capital that was difficult to move, such as machinery, which 
would increase labor productivity. 
 We would like to test formally for structural breaks occurring in 1795, 1814, 1827 
and 1843. Unfortunately, gaps in the data series preclude such a rigorous econometric 
approach. Fortunately, we will see that the observed changes in growth rates tell a 
convincing story on their own. 
 
3.1. Output growth. In figure 1 below we graph the series on real arable output and the 
quantity of arable land in production. In some ways the quantity of arable land in 
production is a better guide to the state of agriculture than output. Annual fluctuations in 
the weather drive a wedge between what farmers are expecting to happen and what 
actually happens, so the amount of land in production sometimes offers a less noisy guide 
to the level of output that was planned or anticipated by farmers. The disadvantage of 
looking at the quantity of land in production is that it can be a misleading indicator of 
output trends if there is productivity growth. Therefore we choose to present both series.  
It is very clear from the graph that there was a significant jump in output growth 
during the early part of the British occupation, 1795-1813. The annual growth rate of 
output in the period of Dutch rule, 1701-94, was 1.9 per cent (±0.2 per cent with 95 per 
cent probability).6 But immediately after the British took over in 1795 the annual growth 
rate jumped to 4.5 per cent (±2.0 per cent). Since the British deliberately avoided 
introducing any significant institutional changes, this suggests that British imperial 
administration generated higher rates of growth than Dutch imperial administration, 
ceteris paribus. This piece of evidence therefore runs counter to the AJR argument that 
British colonies performed worse than those of other imperial powers, ceteris paribus. 
There was then a long period of virtual stasis in the Cape colony in the period 
1814-42. In the sub-period 1814-23 the annual growth rate of output was a mere 0.9 per 
cent (±2.3 per cent) and in the sub-period 1833-42 it was only 0.7 per cent (±1.7 per 
cent). This may be explained partly by the postwar depression, which lasted into the early 
1820s, and partly by the problems that the government was having alienating land. 
However, we can also say that the changes in the legal system in 1827 – the move to 
adversarial trials and the common law – did not have any substantial positive impact on 
the rate of growth in its first 15 years of operation (i.e. up to 1842). This undermines the 
BDL argument that English legal origin was important because its basis in common law 
enabled it to evolve more rapidly to fit new economic circumstances. 
The second marked break in the series occurred in 1843. The growth rate of 
output in the period 1843-75 was 3.5 per cent per annum (±1.6 per cent), nearly 3 
                                                 
6 We estimate the growth rates by regressing the natural logarithm of output (or acreage) on a time trend. 
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percentage points above the rate of 1833-42. This is economically and statistically highly 
significant. It is strong evidence that the key to raising national income was secure 
property rights and that this was achieved by switching the legal basis of landholding 
from the Dutch system of quitrent or loan-place tenure to the English system of freehold 
tenure. This result offers strong support to the line of argument taken by LLSV: property 
rights were important and the British legal system protected them better than any other. 
The massive increase in the growth rate from 1843 is obviously a striking result. 
When we made our initial analysis we had the data only for the years 1852-4 (i.e. we did 
not have the 1865 and 1875 benchmarks). Although there was an extremely high rate of 
growth in the years 1852-4, there was obviously a question as to whether this was just an 
aberration and we were therefore somewhat skeptical this result. But the data for 1865 
and 1875 strongly reinforced the result; extrapolating the area of land in production 
forwards or backwards from 1852-4 puts us almost exactly on the observed data points 
for 1842, 1865 and 1875. 
 
Figure 1. Land in production and real output, 1701-1875. 
 
 These data are supported by the qualitative evidence. It is important to note that 
the extension in acreage was not simply an expansion into more remote areas further 
away from Cape Town. In part, at least, it was an expansion into areas close to Cape 
Town that had previously not been cultivable. For example, Noble (1875, 274-5) notes: 
“Half a century ago it [the Wellington area] was spoken of as the ‘granary’ of the Colony. 
Then the whole of the wheat brought into Cape Town, from all parts, did not exceed 146 
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000 bushels. In 1865, this section of the country alone yielded nearly 400 000 bushels of 
wheat, in addition to 66 829 bushels of barley, 89 784 bushels of rye, 258 559 bushels of 
oats, and 137 548 hundred pounds of oat-hay, besides other produce.”  
Given that the climate of the Cape was generally excessively dry for grain 
cultivation, the main way of rendering more land cultivable was to irrigate it (Alexander, 
1815, pp. 246-7). Hence the Civil Commissioner for the district of Albert commented that 
in the dry year of 1862: “…no wheat could be sown except by the few farmers who 
possessed the means of irrigating their land.” (Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1862, p. 
JJ25). And the Civil Commissioner for district of Mossel Bay commented that: “The soil 
of the division is very productive under irrigation; and it seems a national sin that it 
should, with others, be almost abandoned to the feeding of sheep and the growth of wild 
aloes.” (Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1866, p. JJ15). 
 But by the 1860s many districts had already installed, or were installing, irrigation 
systems. In the district of Graaff-Reinet:  
“The vast importance of dam making has forced itself on the minds of most of the 
sufferers by the drought; and, in several instances, dams are being constructed at a great 
cost of labor and money, with a determination which must eventually overcome many 
obstacles. One experiment, in particular, at Roodebloem, six miles from Graaff-Reinet, is 
being watched by many with great interest. 
“The principal improvement, calculated to benefit those farmers on whose lands 
dam-making is impossible, is the introduction of several powerful forcing and lifting 
pumps, be means of which water can be forced from wells for irrigating purposes.” (Cape 
of Good Hope Blue Book, 1860, p. JJ30-3). 
In Colesberg, “Each year sees an addition to the number of dams in the division.” 
(Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1860, p. JJ30-3). And in Swellendam in 1862, “One 
proprietor in this neighborhood, has, by means of such dams,… converted a dry extent of 
land, formerly fit for grazing during only a few months of the year, into a productive 
grain farm…” (Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1862, p. JJ13). Such examples could be 
multiplied many times. 
One might ask whether this extension of irrigation after 1842 was simply due to 
the spread of superior technology, such as steam pumps, rather than any increase in 
farmers’ willingness to invest. But, in fact, many of the irrigation systems used traditional 
technologies that had been around for centuries. For example, in the district of Robertson: 
“It has been attempted to raise water from the Breede River for irrigation. Two powerful 
pumps have been erected close to the town, the one for wind and the other for horse-
power. A very extensive price of produce land can be thus brought into cultivation.” 
(Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1860, p. JJ30-3). 
It is also noteworthy that there were other forms of increased capital investment 
after 1842, such as improved threshing and plowing machinery. The improved ploughs, 
in particular, would have made it feasible to bring land into cultivation that had been too 
difficult to work with the older, Dutch technology. Hence in Caledon: “Several reaping 
machines have been introduced. These, when properly understood, will be much more 
appreciated, as tending to lessen the amount of manual labor. In some cases, threshing 
machines are being used with advantage. 
“The English and American ploughs are also entirely superseding the heavy 
Dutch plough.” (Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1860, p. JJ30-3). The Blue Book 
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contains similar comments about the divisions of Alexandria, Calvinia, Colesberg, Fort 
Beaufort, Graaf-Reinet, Paarl and Picketberg. 
 Even if we accept that there was an increase in fixed investment and a drastic 
acceleration in output growth in the Cape colony from 1843, can we really attribute this 
to the switch from the Dutch system of land tenure to the British system? In many areas 
of the world output was certainly growing faster in the late nineteenth century than it had 
been in earlier periods. Frontier regions were growing particularly rapidly owing to the 
decline in international freight rates, which enabled their agricultural producers to benefit 
from the rising demand in European markets (Harley, 1995; O’Rourke and Williamson, 
1999). One might wonder whether the rising rate of output growth in the Cape colony 
was just another example of this process in operation. In fact, a comparison with other 
frontier regions shows that the growth rate of the Cape colony was exceptionally slow up 
to 1843 and was relatively fast after 1843: the Cape changed from being the worst-
performing colony in the group to being the best-performing. Table 3 below presents the 
growth rates of output in various frontier regions, as best as we can estimate them. 
 
Table 3. Output growth rates in frontier regions, 1701-1875 (per cent per annum). 
 1701-1794 1795-1813 1814-23 1833-1842 1842-1875 
Cape colony 1.93 
(±0.09) 
4.54 
(±1.01) 
0.91 
(±2.34) 
0.73 
(±1.69) 
3.45 
(±0.84) 
Quebeca 4.18 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.97 
Tasmaniab    11.87 
(3.29) 
1.90 
(0.23) 
New South Walesb    10.83 
(3.53) 
3.64 
(0.32) 
USAc     2.88 
Notes: estimation of standard errors is possible only for the Cape colony; standard errors reported in 
parentheses. The standard error for 1842-75 is particularly large because it is based a fairly small number of 
annual observations. a – data pertain to the years 1706-39, 1739-1844 (which cannot be broken down into 
sub-periods and so is assumed to be constant) and 1844-71. b – data pertain to the years 1833-42 and 1842-
75. c – data pertain to total US output for the years 1839 and 1866-70. All of the data for the frontier 
regions outside the Cape colony are based on the author’s calculations. 
 
 The comparison between the Cape colony and the French colony of Quebec is 
particularly interesting for several reasons. First, the Quebec colony was founded in the 
early 1600s, around the same time as the Cape colony. We would expect the rate of 
output growth to be higher in the early years of a colony’s existence because the volume 
of output starts at a very low base and hence any small absolute increase constitutes a 
very high growth rate. Therefore it is more instructive to compare growth rates in 
colonies of a similar age, such as Quebec and the Cape. Second, there are some fairly 
early data available for Quebec and these show that the French colony consistently grew 
much faster than its Dutch counterpart up to 1842 (with the possible exception of the sub-
period 1795-1813, which the data do not able us to distinguish in the case of Quebec). It 
would be interesting to compare this with output growth in the British North American 
colonies, but unfortunately there are no data available. Third, and most important, the 
British did not change the basis of Quebec’s legal system after they gained permanent 
control of the colony in 1763. They were worried that doing so would generate unrest and 
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possibly force the French colonists to ally with the turbulent British colonists in what is 
now the US. Thus the Quebec Act of 1774 retained the French civil law system for all 
commercial transactions; only criminal law and constitutional law were rebased onto the 
British system. Therefore we would not expect to see a particular acceleration in output 
growth in Quebec after its annexation by the British – in contrast to the Cape colony – 
and this expectation is indeed borne out by the data. 
 The analysis of the output data has revealed that growth accelerated in the Cape 
colony immediately after the British seized control in 1795. This is consistent with the 
Landes view that British colonization was economically benign compared to that of other 
imperial powers, and it rebuts the contrary AJR view. There was then a period of 
stagnation during the postwar depression and this was not influenced by the move to 
adversarial trials and a common law system in 1827, thus casting doubt on the BDL view 
that the benefit of the British legal system was to be found in its evolutionary common 
law characteristic. Finally, there was a marked acceleration from 1843 that was not 
simply due to the worldwide acceleration of the late nineteenth century. Instead it was 
caused by the change in the basis of landholding from the Dutch to the British system, 
which increased the security of farmer’s property rights and encouraged fixed investment. 
This vindicates the original argument of LLSV using new time series data. 
 
3.2. Productivity growth. The story on output growth in the Cape colony is clear 
but what about productivity growth? The scarcity of data means that we can consider 
only labor productivity with any degree of reliability but this turns out to be very 
interesting. Labor productivity boomed after 1842, with the value of real output per 
worker approximately tripling up to 1854. But labor productivity then collapsed and by 
1865 had regained its old level of 1842, as demonstrated in figure 2 below. Given the 
apparently strange evolution of labor productivity, we need to ask two questions. First, 
did this boom really occur? Second, if the boom did really occur, then why? An obvious 
place to look for corroborating evidence of a labor productivity boom is in the real wage 
data, and here we are reassured. The pattern of real wages supports the existence of a 
short-lived boom in labor productivity, with a substantial spike in real wages at just the 
same time as the spike in labor productivity. This is again demonstrated in figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Labor productivity and the real wage, 1701-1875. 
 
In seeking to explain the boom it is interesting to make a breakdown of labor 
productivity. One way that we can think of output per worker is simply as the product of 
acres per worker and output per acre. Making this decomposition for the Cape colony in 
the nineteenth century reveals that output per acre was virtually unchanged over the 
whole period. But there was a large spike in acres per worker after 1843; it reached a 
peak in 1855 before slumping back again to its initial level by 1865. This is shown in 
figure 3 below. Notice also that real output per acre and the number of acres per worker 
tend to be inversely correlated. This is for two reasons. First, as each worker has more 
acres to cultivate we would expect him to have less time to devote to each acre and this 
will push down yields (so land productivity will fall even though labor productivity is 
rising). Second, increasing the land-labor ratio generally involved bringing more land 
into production. Ceteris paribus, this marginal land would have been of lower quality and 
this would have put downward pressure on average output per acre. The only period 
when the series move together – rather than inversely – is in the 1850s, when they both 
rise together. This is what we would expect following the improvement in the security of 
property rights. Landowners not only wanted to bring more land into production but also 
now wanted to invest in more fixed capital in order to improve its yield. Therefore, 
output per acre and acres per worker both rose at the same time for a short period. 
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Figure 3. Decomposing the variation in labor productivity, 1701-1875. 
 
The exceptional spike in the land-labor ratio that occurred in the 1850s is 
consistent with our argument that reforming the laws of land ownership was 
economically extremely important. As soon as property rights in land were secured by a 
move to freehold tenure it became worthwhile to invest in the land. This enabled more 
land to be brought into production quite rapidly. But the supply of labor was inelastic and 
therefore the land-labor ratio rose very rapidly, which in turn generated a sharp increase 
in both labor productivity and real wages. However, this was not a long-run equilibrium. 
High real wages and the increased availability of cultivable land attracted thousands of 
British migrants to the Cape colony, which drove down labor productivity and real wages 
to a more sustainable level. This is illustrated in figure 4 below, where the series on land 
in production jumps after 1842, a decade before the jumps in total population and the 
number of agricultural workers. It is important to be clear on this point. The acreage in 
production was not responding to an increase in population; the population was 
responding (up to 1865, at least) to the increase in acreage. In fact, there was also an 
unanticipated positive shock that substantially boosted the population of the Cape colony 
after 1865: the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886. But these events 
fortuitously followed the increase in the Cape’s ability to feed itself, rather than led it. 
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Figure 4. Population, agricultural workforce and land in production, 1701-1875. 
 
 The data on labor productivity are consistent with our story on output growth. So 
are the data on land productivity, although the high year-on-year yield fluctuations make 
it impossible to draw firm conclusions. The main arable crop in terms of volume and 
value was wheat. Wheat yields averaged around 6 bushels per acre in the period 1833-42, 
which was extremely low by international standards. Wheat yields climbed to 7 bushels 
per acre in 1865 and 9 bushels per acre in 1875; this is what we would expect to see in 
response to the spread of irrigation and other fixed capital equipment. It would be 
interesting to complete the picture with data on capital and total factor productivity but, 
unfortunately, data limitations prevent such an exercise. 
 
4. Conclusions. At three points in time there were important, discrete and exogenous 
changes in the colonial and institutional basis of the Cape colony in southern Africa. In 
1795 Britain replaced Holland as the colonial power, whilst maintaining Dutch 
institutions and customs; in 1827 the British system of adversarial and common law 
justice was introduced; and in 1843 property rights in land were made more secure. 
Throughout this period the geographical endowment, notably in terms of the disease 
environment, was held constant. This identifying variance has enabled us to undertake 
time series tests of the effects on economic growth of legal origins and the security of 
property rights (as proposed by LLSV), legal origins and the evolution of legal systems 
(as proposed by BDL), and endowments and colonial origins (as proposed by AJR). 
 We find that improving the security of property rights in land had an immediate, 
positive and large effect on the rate of growth of output and productivity – just as LLSV 
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would predict and just as Adam Smith was arguing back in 1776. After the 
transformation of property rights the Cape changed from being the worst-performing 
colony to being the best-performing colony in terms of economic growth. By contrast, we 
find that improving the ability of the legal system to evolve by switching to a common 
law system had no effect on the rate of economic growth – contrary to the predictions of 
BDL. We find that changing the colonial power from Holland to Britain had an 
immediate, positive and large effect on the rate of growth of output – contrary to the 
predictions of AJR. Our finding that better or worse institutions can be introduced into a 
particular colony (that is, we can change the identity of the colonial power from Holland 
to Britain and we can improve the security of property rights in land, and both of these 
have an immediate and positive effect on economic growth) suggests that the link 
between geographical endowment and the quality of institutions is not robust – contrary 
to the predictions of AJR. The growth trajectory of the Cape colony changed very rapidly 
following changes in its institutional base. This suggests that modern developing 
countries are not necessarily doomed to be prisoners of either their endowments on their 
inherited institutions. 
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Appendix 1. The population of the Cape colony. Van Duin and Ross transcribed the 
Opgaaf census returns of the Dutch East India Company. They report population data 
from 1701 onwards, broken down by district and type of person (male/female, 
adult/juvenile, white/black, freeman/slave).7 I have not been able to verify directly the 
accuracy of the transcription, since I do not read Dutch and have not consulted the 
original sources, but Van Duin and Ross seem to have taken reasonable care in 
transcribing the data. For example, they explain that some individual entries have been 
corrected because they appear to be slips of the pen. However, the handling of the data 
after transcription does not appear to have been as thorough and transparent as one might 
like, and here I note four caveats. 
 First, Van Duin and Ross appear to have made many arithmetic errors in adding 
up the data. When I entered the district-level data and tried to match my population totals 
with that of Van Duin and Ross there was usually a discrepancy of several hundred 
persons out of a total of around 30 000 persons. Second, it is difficult to work out to what 
the data actually refer because the titles of the tables provided by Van Duin and Ross are 
rather misleading. For example, table 1 in appendix 2 bears the legend “Population, total 
Cape Colony”. But it turns out that this total does not include the East India Company 
Establishment (i.e. Company personnel), nor their families and personal slaves, nor the 
East India Company slaves. In that sense, it is a rather unusual concept of ‘total’. Third, 
there appears to be no data at all concerning the families and personal slaves of the East 
India Company Establishment. The East India Company Establishment itself is accounted 
separately and does not enter into the total for the Cape district; the implication of 
footnote 1 on p. 126 is that the families and personal slaves of the Company 
Establishment did not enter into the total for the Cape district either. Since the families 
and personal slaves are not accounted separately anywhere else, this implies that they are 
completely missing from the enumeration. After 1730 the Company Establishment was 
never less than 1 000 people, and after 1781 rarely less than 2 000 people. If each 
Company employee had, say, four other people in his household then this would imply an 
under-enumeration of 4 000 to 8 000 persons out of a total population of 25 000 to 40 
000. This error is therefore quite substantial. Fourth, the data for all types of person are 
missing for a number of years, such as 1761, 1771, 1781 1794 and a few others; and the 
data for free blacks are completely missing prior to 1720 and after 1773. 
 I have therefore treated the data as follows. First, the data for missing years have 
been linearly interpolated. Second, the population totals for free blacks have been linearly 
extrapolated prior to 1720 and after 1773 (a regression reveals that a linear trend of an 
increase of 3 persons per annum provides a very good fit of the data from 1720 to 1773). 
Third, I have multiplied the figures on Company Establishment by five to compensate for 
the absence of their households from the enumeration data. I arrived at the estimate of 
four unenumerated persons per household as follows. Over the period 1701-95 the ratio 
of white women and children to white men in the Cape district averaged 2.45; we can 
interpret this (somewhat simplistically) as one wife and 1.45 children per male. I assume 
that the average family structure of Company Establishment men was the same as other 
households in Cape district. I then added on a rather arbitrary 1.55 slaves per household, 
giving a total of four unenumerated persons. With some care and persistence it would 
probably be possible to improve upon this estimate by looking at the documentary 
                                                 
7 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 112-26. 
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sources about particular families in the period, but this is rather beyond the scope of the 
present paper.  
The British continued with the Dutch model of an annual census once they had 
established themselves in power, and for the period 1806-23 these census returns are 
reproduced in the Records of the Cape Colony.8 British efforts thereafter became more 
sporadic; whilst there was good coverage in the period 1833-42, we are reduced to 
approximately quinquennial observations in the period 1847-75.9 It is also important to 
get a breakdown of the total population by sex in order to generate a more precise 
estimate of total labor inputs. Whilst modern populations in the developed economies are 
split approximately equally between men and women – with slightly more women than 
men, owing to their greater longevity – this was definitely not the case in frontier 
societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Adult males were more likely to 
migrate and survive and the proportion of males in the total population was therefore 
typically much higher than one half. My estimates of both the total and the male 
populations of the Cape colony are reported in table A1 below. 
 We need one more piece of information in order to calculate agricultural 
productivity: the proportion of the population working in agriculture. Data on occupation 
is considerably more difficult to find that data on population. Moreover, since we are 
concerned only with arable agriculture, we would ideally like to split up the agricultural 
workforce into arable and pastoral workers. We would also like to split up the 
agricultural workforce into males and females because the labor input of a female is 
generally reckoned to have been only two-thirds of that of a male. (This is plausible, 
given the heavy physical element of agricultural work at this time, although the precise 
fraction of two-thirds is simply a crude estimate based on the ratio of male to female 
wages). I have tackled this problem as follows. 
First, I assume for simplicity that all arable workers were males and that all 
pastoral workers were females. This is a crude assumption but captures the basic fact that 
many of the tasks of pastoral agriculture were undertaken by women (such as dairy work 
and much of the herding), whereas the major arable tasks were typically the preserve of 
men (plowing, reaping, carting). Since I am interested only in arable productivity in this 
analysis, I can therefore content myself with estimating the total number of adult males 
employed in agriculture.  
Second, from 1856 onwards we have direct evidence from the census of the 
number of workers in arable agriculture.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Theal, Records, vol. 6, p. 75, p. 248, p. 442; vol. 7, p. 239, p. 477; vol. 8, p. 233; vol. 9, p. 48, p. 299; vol. 
10, p. 228; vol. 11, p. 51, p. 238, pp. 438-9; vol. 12, pp. 128-9, pp. 414-5; vol. 13, pp. 354-5; vol. 14, pp. 
246-7; vol. 15, pp. 198-9; vol. 16, pp. 488-9. 
9 British Parliamentary Papers, 1836, vol. 46, pp. 638-41, pp. 648-9; 1839, vol. 45, pp. 747-7; 1840, vol. 
43, pp. 622-3, pp. 630-3; 1844, vol. 1846, pp. 405-7, pp. 410-13; 1849, vol. 52, p. 359; 1857, vol. 40, p. 
293, pp. 300-1; 1859 (session 2), vol. 31, p. 402; Government of the Cape of Good Hope, Census of 1865; 
Census of 1875. 
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Table A1. Population of the Cape Colony, 1701-1875. 
Year Total Males Agric Year Total Males Agric Year Total Males Agric 
1701 5481 2492 1903 1752 19636 9492 7248 1803    
1702 5925 2657 2029 1753 19900 9970 7613 1804    
1703 5953 2726 2081 1754 20531 10261 7836 1805    
1704 5978 2770 2115 1755 20781 10298 7864 1806 76855 43004 28438 
1705 6034 2870 2191 1756 18159 9395 7174 1807 73482 41639 27379 
1706 6012 2852 2178 1757 19698 9823 7501 1808 73873 42147 29412 
1707 6091 2933 2240 1758 19769 9907 7565 1809 75538 42477 29427 
1708 6261 3054 2332 1759 19918 10268 7841 1810 80443 44972 30928 
1709 7470 3656 2792 1760 20462 10607 8100 1811 87018 48278 32958 
1710 7651 3757 2869 1761 21017 10934 8349 1812 81964 45249 30661 
1711 8017 3758 2870 1762 20923 11080 8461 1813 84373 46888 31534 
1712 7649 3761 2872 1763 21805 11592 8852 1814 84657 47105 31442 
1713 7649 3890 2970 1764 23756 12219 9331 1815 85739 46795 30998 
1714 7395 3631 2773 1765 23532 12447 9505 1816 88486 48461 31390 
1715 8003 3830 2925 1766 25098 12910 9858 1817 97535 53200 32682 
1716 8511 4295 3279 1767 24629 12727 9719 1818 98844 54318 33570 
1717 8947 4533 3462 1768 24892 12890 9843 1819 101657 55478 33348 
1718 9097 4597 3510 1769 25530 13041 9958 1820 105356 57104 34126 
1719 9224 4732 3613 1770 25905 13168 10055 1821 112147 60414 35524 
1720 9271 4633 3538 1771 26804 13509 10316 1822 111451 60086 35200 
1721 9341 4682 3575 1772 27923 13869 10591 1823 116204 62617 36617 
1722 9688 4832 3690 1773 29276 14352 10960 1824    
1723 10095 5174 3951 1774 29908 14577 11131 1825    
1724 10548 5490 4192 1775 29738 14742 11257 1826    
1725 10585 5790 4421 1776 30368 15254 11648 1827    
1726 11198 6057 4625 1777 30543 15757 12032 1828    
1727 12563 6545 4998 1778 30389 16056 12261 1829    
1728 12366 6449 4925 1779 31748 16932 12929 1830    
1729 12078 6350 4849 1780 31867 16846 12864 1831    
1730 12489 6507 4969 1781 32302 16851 12867 1832    
1731 13261 5926 4525 1782 34052 17066 13032 1833 145042 75599 43193 
1732 13511 6970 5322 1783 33773 17277 13193 1834    
1733 13225 7148 5458 1784 34943 18164 13870 1835    
1734 14767 7576 5785 1785 36611 18682 14266 1836 150110 76987 43398 
1735 15130 8001 6110 1786 37955 19312 14747 1837 140429 72280 39862 
1736 15659 8501 6492 1787 44308 21683 16557 1838 147341 75485 41417 
1737 15133 8430 6437 1788 44106 20967 16011 1839 143271 73949 40026 
1738 15828 8551 6530 1789 45228 21362 16313 1840 150255 76578 40145 
1739 15448 8423 6432 1790 44664 21391 16334 1841 147021 75028 38056 
1740 16356 8593 6562 1791 43564 21336 16293 1842 159451 82025 40208 
1741 16200 8356 6381 1792 40154 20477 15636     
1742 16825 8870 6773 1793 41272 20601 15713 1847 185000   
1743 15764 8354 6379 1794 42857 21633 16519     
1744 15728 8157 6228 1795 44441 22665 17308 1853 224827 113240 34306 
1745 16332 8276 6320 1796    1854 248625 124431 35578 
1746 16603 8431 6438 1797    1855 234345 118010 31733 
1747 17228 8484 6479 1798 62000   1856 267096  33638 
1748 17427 8535 6518 1799        
1749 16364 8505 6495 1800    1865 496381 255760 73140 
1750 17986 8927 6817 1801        
1751 18346 9126 6969 1802    1875 720984 369628 128600 
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Third, for the years 1833 and 1836-9 the population sources give us the total 
number of workers in agriculture, industry and commerce in each district of the Cape 
colony. If the total number of agricultural workers was less than 65 per cent of the total 
number of males in the district, then I assumed that all the agricultural workers were 
male. I chose this 65 per cent cut-off somewhat arbitrarily to reflect the fact that many 
males were not adult and the fact that some males would have worked in other sectors. If 
the total number of agricultural workers was greater than 65 per cent of the total number 
of males in the district, then I assumed that 65 per cent of the total number of males in the 
district were agricultural workers and that the remaining agricultural workers were 
women. This enables me to estimate that total number of males working in agriculture in 
the Cape colony in the period 1833-9. This procedure suggests that overall around 56 per 
cent of agricultural workers were male. This seems plausible because I would expect 
female workers to be more concentrated in domestic work and industries such as cloth 
production; it is also consistent with the later census data. 
Fourth, I calculated the proportion of the total male population that was working 
in agriculture in each year in the period 1833-9 (around 55 per cent) and then regressed 
this series on a time trend. This revealed that the proportion was falling by 0.5 per cent 
per annum and the coefficient was highly statistically significant. This result seems 
plausible, since I would generally expect a frontier economy to be gradually moving 
away from its agricultural basis over time. I extrapolated the proportion of males working 
in agriculture back to 1806, at which point it was 76 per cent, and I assumed that the 
proportion was constant at this level between 1701 and 1806.  
Fifth, moving forwards in time, I linearly interpolated the proportion of males 
working in agriculture between 1839 and 1856.  
Whilst these assumptions are crude, I do not believe that it is possible to do 
substantially better given the current availability of data: hopefully the situation will 
improve in the future. We will also see that the general results of this paper are not very 
sensitive to the precise assumptions about the proportion of males in agriculture. For the 
convenience of other researchers, my estimates are reproduced in table A1, where 
“Agric” is the total number of adult male workers in agriculture; figures in italics are 
estimated. 
 
 
Appendix 2. Wheat output. The primary data series on arable output during the period 
of Dutch rule in the Cape colony is that provided by the Opgaaf returns. The Opgaaf 
recorded the output declared by farmers for the purposes of taxation. Since there were 
essentially no independent checks on the farmers’ declarations, we can immediately see 
that the Opgaaf returns are likely to underreport true output – farmers were likely to 
conceal some of their output in order to lighten the burden of taxation. The question then 
arises as to how much output went unrecorded and whether it was constant over time. 
Before constructing a new set of output estimates, it is important to see why the existing 
estimates are unsatisfactory and how we might improve upon them. Hence I begin by 
reworking the estimates of Van Duin and Ross and showing how the errors and 
imprecisions in their calculations lead to a substantial under-estimate of total output.10 I 
then derive my own, alternative estimates. 
                                                 
10 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 21-6. 
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Reworking Van Duin and Ross: 1789-95. The Opgaaf records the amount of wheat 
entered for market consumption (which was taxed) and the amount of wheat set aside for 
seed (which was not taxed). There was a third category called ‘Bread Corn’ which was 
essentially on-farm consumption and which was neither recorded nor taxed. The problem 
is to estimate the true values for each of these categories for a particular year or years, 
and then compare them to the recorded values; this will enable us to estimate a correction 
factor for underreporting which we can then use to reflate the official annual returns for 
other years. 
Let us first deal with bread corn. For five years in the early eighteenth century, we 
know the ratio of bread corn to the Opgaaf seed return; on average, it was 4.228.11 
Following Van Duin and Ross, I proceed on the assumption that this ratio was constant 
over time and that I can estimate the amount of bread corn each year by multiplying the 
Opgaaf seed return by 4.228. Following Van Duin and Ross, I also assume that the 
quantity of seed was underreported by the same proportion as the quantity of marketed 
(i.e. taxable) output. The rationale for this is that the tax collectors would have a fairly 
good idea of the yield-seed ratio, so the farmers would have to underreport the amount of 
seed that they used (even though it was tax free) because otherwise the tax collectors 
would realize that they were underreporting their marketable output. Van Duin and Ross 
then write down the following equation: 
 
Q = a*(TAXABLE + 5.228*SEED)    (Equation 1) 
 
where Q is total output, a is the correction factor for underreporting, TAXABLE is the 
taxable output recorded in the Opgaaf and SEED is the quantity of seed recorded in the 
Opgaaf.12 
 The error in equation 1 comes from the fact that Van Duin and Ross are also 
multiplying the bread corn estimate by the correction factor, a. There is no reason to 
suppose that the bread corn estimates from the early eighteenth century are 
underreported, so there is no justification for reflating the quantity of bread corn. 
According to Van Duin and Ross, what we observe in the early eighteenth century is the 
ratio of the (accurately reported) bread corn to the (underreported) seed. Hence to 
accurately estimate bread corn in the later period, we need to multiply the ratio that we 
derived from the early eighteenth century data by the (underreported) seed from the later 
period.13 So the correct equation should be: 
 
Q = a*(TAXABLE + SEED) + 4.228*SEED  (Equation 2) 
 
                                                 
11 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 98. The figures are: 1709, 3.39; 1710, 6.39; 1711, 4.21; 1713, 4.18; 
1715, 2.97. Van Duin and Ross assume that bread corn was three times the quantity of seed corn. I see no 
reason to use a less precise number when a more precise number is available, so I take the ratio to be the 
mean value of the available data – that is, 4.228. 
12 Note that we have 5.228 times the amount of seed because bread corn was 4.228 times the amount of 
seed and seed itself was 1 times the amount of seed: 1+4.228=5.228. 
13 In fact, we will see below that there is good reason to believe that in the early eighteenth century neither 
the seed nor the bread corn were underreported. We consider this issue in due course. 
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 It turns out that this correction makes a substantial difference to the results. The 
average total output in the first years of British rule (1798-1806), when the output returns 
are believed to have been fairly complete, was 102 812.3 mudden.14 Following Van Duin 
and Ross, suppose that this was also the true output in the final years of Dutch rule (1789-
95). The average Opgaaf returns for those years was 20 724 mudden of marketable output 
and 3 345 mudden for seed. Then: 
 
102 812.3 = a*(20 724 + 3 345) + 4.228*3 345  (Equation 3) 
 
This implies that a is 3.68. Putting the same numbers into (the incorrect) equation 1 
implies that a is 2.69. Thus my estimate for the marketable output is 76 346 and for the 
non-marketable output (bread and seed) is 26 538. The Van Duin and Ross estimate for 
the marketable output is 55 198 and for the non-marketable output is 47 615.15 
 Van Duin and Ross present three checks on their estimate. First, they rearrange 
their equation to derive the implied yield-seed ratio, which they take to be: 
 
TAXABLE/SEED + 5.228     (Equation 4) 
 
They then calculate that the implied yield-seed ratio is 9.94; since this is the same as the 
ratio observed in the early nineteenth century (when the British administrators were 
collecting more accurate data), they argue that this offers corroboration of their methods. 
But, notice first that their equation 4 cannot be derived from their equation 1. Equation 1 
actually implies that the yield-seed ratio is: 
 
a*(TAXABLE + 5.228*SEED)/a*SEED   (Equation 5) 
  
Hence their estimates imply a yield-seed ratio of 11.29. Notice second that their argument 
is entirely spurious. Effectively, all that Van Duin and Ross are doing in equation 4 is 
multiplying TAXABLE and SEED by a and then taking the ratio. If we multiply the 
numerator and denominator of any fraction by the same factor, then its value will remain 
unchanged. The correction factor a could be 1 or 1 million and the estimate of the yield-
seed ratio provided by Van Duin and Ross in equation 4 would be unchanged: hence this 
simply cannot act as a check on their estimated value of a. 
 The second check on their output estimate proposed by Van Duin and Ross comes 
from the barrier across the Cape Town road that recorded all movements of wheat. In the 
three years 1792-4 we know that 63 332, 69 695 and 58 893 mudden of wheat went to the 
Cape Town market. Of course, we might suppose that some marketed grain did not reach 
Cape Town (it could be sold to consumers outside the city) and that the farmers might 
have avoided the barrier whenever possible (since they were habitually underreporting 
the amount of grain that they marketed). To the extent that these two causes led to an 
under-registration of grain at the barrier, the average barrier returns of 63 973 can be 
                                                 
14 This is the average of 1798 (110 025 mudden) and 1806 (95 599.5 mudden). Strictly speaking, this is not 
the total output, which was actually rather higher. But it is the total output measured on the same 
geographical basis as the figures in the Opgaaf, which is the relevant consideration here. 
15 In fact, the Van Duin and Ross estimate of marketable output is 62 171 because they inexplicably revise 
their estimate of a up from 2.76 to 3. 
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regarded as a lower bound estimate of the marketed output. Yet this lower bound estimate 
already exceeds the 55 192 estimated by Van Duin and Ross. 
 The third check on their output estimate proposed by Van Duin and Ross comes 
from the dispensier of the Dutch East India Company. He was the official responsible for 
Company grain purchases in the Cape and a person whom we might suppose to have 
been well informed about agricultural conditions. He estimated that a successful harvest 
would yield 70 000 to 80 000 mudden of marketed grain. This is rather more similar to 
my estimate of 76 346 mudden than to the Van Duin and Ross estimate of 55 192 
mudden. 
 Finally, there is a fourth check that we can make which is carefully avoided by 
Van Duin and Ross, even though they make use of it for the early eighteenth century (as I 
discuss further below). That is, we can estimate total output based on total consumption, 
since everything that is produced must be consumed.16 There were 31 948 inhabitants of 
the Cape Colony in 1793 and it is estimated that each of them consumed around 2.5 
mudden of wheat per annum.17 Passing ships, of which there were 128 in 1793, generally 
loaded up around 40 mudden of grain each.18 And exports in 1793 were 9 679 mudden.19 
This implies a total consumption of 117 979 mudden. If I take my estimate of marketed 
grain (76 346 mudden) and add to it the bread corn that was consumed on the farm (14 
143 mudden) then I get an estimate of grain production (net of seed) of 90 489 mudden. 
Obviously, my estimate based on the Opgaaf is rather lower than the estimate derived 
from the consumption side. Notice, however, that the 1793 consumption estimate is also 
much higher than either of the output estimates generated by the British in 1798 and 
1806, which average only 102 812 mudden. This suggests to me that the coefficient on 
population of 2.5 mudden that I used in the consumption model is rather high, probably 
because it does not allow for the systematic differences between the diets of slaves and 
freemen. The average estimated European consumption of eight bushels per head applies 
to a free population. By contrast, the Cape colonists seem to have fed their slaves around 
5 bushels of bread grain (which I take to be wheat) per annum and 3 bushels of peas and 
beans.20 Given that there were 13 842 freemen and 14 747 slaves in the colony in 1793, 
this would lead to an average per capita wheat consumption of 6.45 bushels (2.17 
mudden). 
 The first conclusion to be drawn from all this is that my estimate of a marketable 
output of 76 276 mudden may be slightly low but is much more consistent with the 
evidence than the Van Duin and Ross estimate of 55 192 mudden. This implies that my 
correction factor of 3.68 is more appropriate than the alternative of 2.69. The second 
conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the margins of error in this type of calculation 
are likely to be large and that this is not a very satisfactory way of proceeding. This is an 
issue to which we return below. 
 
                                                 
16 Of course, there might be some wastage and therefore we would expect the production estimate to be a 
little higher than the consumption estimate. However, it seems reasonable to suppose that farmers kept this 
wastage to a minimum, just as they do today. 
17 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 25. Note that 2.5 mudden equals 7.43 bushels; in Europe in this 
period grain consumption was generally reckoned to be about 8 bushels per head. 
18 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 127. 
19 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 129. 
20 Anon., “Return”, p. 216. 
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Reworking Van Duin and Ross: 1701-48. It is only after 1748 that there is a really 
noticeable difference between the trend in exports and the trend in the Opgaaf returns. On 
this basis, Van Duin and Ross argue that the level of evasion was probably lower (and 
fairly constant) in the years before 1748 and then increased substantially up to the late 
eighteenth century.21 The issue is then to calculate the level of evasion between 1701 and 
1748. Unfortunately, the method that they adopt to do this is fundamentally flawed. 
 Van Duin and Ross take a sample of four years in which harvests were very low 
(1726-7 and 1739-40) and argue that in those years the quantities of wheat production 
and consumption were probably equal in the local market. They then calculate the total 
consumption for these years implied by the consumption model that I used above; then 
they show that this is 1.3 times the Opgaaf returns for marketable output in these years. 
They then take 1.3 as their correction factor for the period 1701-48. This strategy makes 
no sense. First, notice that wheat production must always equal wheat consumption.22 
Moreover, we have direct evidence on wheat exports. In this situation, there is no reason 
for Van Duin and Ross to restrict their calculations to the years 1726-7 and 1739-40; they 
can calculate consumption in every year and compare it to the Opgaaf returns, knowing 
that on average this will give an accurate estimate of the correction factor. In this sense, 
Van Duin and Ross are throwing away data that they could have used and the accuracy of 
their estimate of the correction factor will be greatly reduced. Second, it is highly likely 
that evasion will be systematically lower in years when the harvest is poor because 
farmers have less to hide. In this sense, the Van Duin and Ross estimate is almost 
certainly biased downwards. 
 There is no benefit to redoing these calculations at this point. However, I shall 
return to this point below. 
 
Reworking Van Duin and Ross: 1749-1772. Van Duin and Ross apply the correction 
factor that they calculate for the late eighteenth century to all the years after 1772 
(although they do not offer any justification for this). Given a correction factor of 1.3 for 
the years up to 1748, it then remains for them only to estimate the changing correction 
factor for the years between 1748 and 1773. In the absence of any evidence on the issue, 
they simply linearly interpolate so that they correction factor rises by 0.3 every five years. 
This is obviously not particularly compelling. 
 
My estimates. There are three aspects to consider when we estimate an output series: the 
level, the trend and the fluctuations. Each of these elements must be estimated accurately 
if our series is to be useful for economic analysis. Following the discussion above, it 
seems highly unlikely that Van Duin and Ross have accurately fixed the level or the trend 
in wheat output. By contrast, the fluctuations are probably reasonably accurate. Notice 
that the fluctuations in wheat yields (and therefore output) are always large relative to the 
mean level of yields; this is simply a product of the fact that wheat yields are strongly 
influenced by the weather and that the weather varies greatly from one year to the next. If 
the average level of yields is 1 then we find that yields in England in the early nineteenth 
century commonly fluctuated between 0.6 and 1.4. According the Opgaaf returns, the 
                                                 
21 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, p. 25. 
22 Of course, there could be some storage from one year to the next. But farmers cannot build up stocks 
indefinitely, so production and consumption must be equal on average. 
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level of variablility was the same in the Cape Colony in the eighteenth century as it was 
in England slightly later. This seems to me to be highly plausible and suggests that the 
Opgaaf returns do indeed capture the year-on-year fluctuation in yields. We can now 
frame our problem more clearly: how can we adjust the level and trend of the Opgaaf 
series whilst retaining the fluctuations? 
 Simple logic tells us that the trend in output must equal the trend in consumption, 
since output must equal consumption on average. I will therefore use a variant of the 
consumption model that I developed above to estimate the trend in output. 
 The final issue is to estimate the level of consumption at either the beginning or 
the end of the period.23 The output calculations that I made above for the years 1789-95 
were not very satisfactory because they did not mesh very well with the consumption 
estimates and they were based on data from 1798-1806, which might themselves not be 
wholly accurate and might not be representative of the situation a decade earlier. By 
contrast, the data for the early period are much more promising, and here we need to look 
again at the years 1709-15 when the Dutch East India Company put exceptional effort 
into collecting output data. 
 I used the consumption model outlined above to estimate annual consumption 
back to 1701. I then divided that series by the consumption estimates implied by the 
Opgaaf returns (that is, the taxable output plus bread corn). This ratio is plotted in figure 
A1 below. Since the Opgaaf returns fluctuate wildly with the harvest, whilst population 
changes gradually, the ratio of the two series also fluctuates wildly. Hence the ratio is 
unlikely to be accurate for any one year but nonetheless is likely to be quite informative 
over a period of years. Van Duin and Ross argue that the data collected in the period 
1709-15 are not obviously more complete that those collected in other years: figure A1 
strongly suggests the contrary. The ratio of Opgaaf to consumption can be taken as a 
guide to the level of underreporting; over the whole period it averages 0.47, suggesting an 
average correction factor of 2.13. But notice that underreporting does indeed seem to 
grow after 1748, as Van Duin and Ross suggest. And notice also that the ratio of Opgaaf 
to consumption was far higher in the period 1710-14 than at any other time.24 Given how 
thoroughly the Company officials were questioning farmers about what was happening to 
their grain (in terms of market, seed and bread corn), it seems to me quite likely that the 
farmers felt obliged to give returns that were fairly accurate. Nonetheless, the Opgaaf 
returns in those years still came to only 85 per cent of the consumption estimates. Should 
we therefore conclude that the Opgaaf returns were underreporting 15 per cent of output? 
I do not think so: I believe that the consumption model is overestimating output by 15 per 
cent. Recall from above that the 1793 output estimate based on the consumption model 
was 117 978, whilst the output estimate from the corrected Opgaaf returns was only 102 
812. The means that the estimate based on the Opgaaf returns was only 87 per cent of the 
estimate based on the consumption model. Thus the discrepancies between the two 
methods of estimating output are remarkably close in 1710-14 and 1793. Since there is 
reason to believe that the consumption figures are too high (owing to the effect of slave 
                                                 
23 If we know the trend and the level at one end, then the level at the other end follows automatically. 
24 The years 1709 and 1715 were not noticeably different from earlier and later years; I suspect that the 
investigative machinery of the Company was not functioning with full rigor in those years and that the data 
that they collected was therefore rather less accurate.  Hence in the following analysis I am going to 
concentrate on the five-year period 1710-14. 
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diets on total consumption), I suggest that the most plausible way of reconciling the 
estimates is to revise downwards the consumption estimates. If we assume that average 
per capita consumption was 2 mudden per annum, rather than 2.5, then the estimates 
from the consumption model exactly match both the Opgaaf returns for 1710-14 and the 
corrected Opgaaf returns for 1789-95. 
 
Figure A1. The ratio of Opgaaf to consumption. 
 
I put these three elements together as follows. I take the Opgaaf returns of 1710-
14 as my base level. Then I use the consumption model (now with a coefficient of 2 on 
population) to estimate the underlying output in each year; I reflate this using the Opgaaf 
seed/yield ratio to get gross output and I extract the trend. I apply the trend to my base 
level and then superimpose the fluctuations from the Opgaaf returns as follows. I take a 
nine-year rolling average of the Opgaaf returns and calculate the ratio of the central year 
to the average.25 I then take my constructed series based on the consumption model and 
the benchmark of 1710-14 and multiply each year by the ratio that I estimate from the 
                                                 
25 I progressively shrink the sample window in the early and later years of the sample in order that I can 
still estimate the ratio that I need even though there are fewer than nine years of data. 
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Opgaaf data. In figure A2 below I plot for each year my estimates of total output, the 
uncorrected Opgaaf data, and the Van Duin and Ross correction of the Opgaaf data.26 
 
Figure A2. Three estimates of total wheat output. 
 
 Figure A2 shows that my output estimates are somewhat higher than those of Van 
Duin and Ross, and much higher than the Opgaaf. The standard deviations of both my 
series and that of Van Duin and Ross are higher than that of the Opgaaf series, but this is 
only because the means are also higher: the coefficients of variation are the same, by 
construction.  
 The data for the period after 1795 are much more straightforward. The British 
seem to have collected fairly accurate data on agricultural output in the Cape colony, just 
                                                 
26 I have added an estimate for bread corn to the Opgaaf totals for seed and marketed output: otherwise it 
would not reflect total output. The Van Duin and Ross estimates for total output are not available in The 
Economy; both table 2 in Appendix 7 and graph III.3 show only (marketed output + exports + shipping), 
and hence ignore on-farm consumption. Thus I have added on-farm consumption to their estimates, based 
on equation 2 above. 
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as they did in other colonies such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Hence we have 
annual data on wheat output for 1806-23, 1833, 1836-42, 1853-5, 1865 and 1875.27 
 
Appendix 3. Other arable outputs. In order to estimate total arable output I need to 
estimate the output of the arable crops other than wheat. The Opgaaf returns give the 
same type of information for barley and rye that they give for wheat. For other arable 
crops there is no information at all available. I now consider each of these crops in turn. 
Estimating rye output is particularly problematic because the importance of rye 
appears to be falling over time. The Opgaaf figures suggest that the output of rye was five 
times that of barley in 1701 (about 2 500 mudden) but had declined to zero by the late 
eighteenth century, by which time the output of barley had quadrupled. If I used a model 
of rye consumption analogous to my model of wheat consumption then the output of rye 
could never fall – it would have to rise in line with population because I would be 
multiplying population by a constant. Moreover, it is not clear how else I could hope to 
estimate the correct trend, since there was probably a change over time in the level of 
evasion (and hence the correction factor). Although the total output of barley was rising 
over time, it is noteworthy that it too was falling substantially in importance compared to 
wheat, suggesting that using a model based on population is unlikely to really get at the 
heart of the problem. I suggest that the best way forward in these circumstances is the 
following. Suppose that the level of evasion for barley and rye was the same as that for 
wheat. Then the proportions of wheat, barley and rye reported each year in the Opgaaf 
returns would be accurate, even though the levels would be too low. So I can estimate the 
total output of barley and rye by multiplying my estimate of total wheat output by the 
proportions of barley and rye in total grain output, as measured by the Opgaaf returns.28 
The results of this exercise are graphed in figure A3 below and reported in table A2 for 
the convenience of future researchers. The striking aspect of the graph is the 
unimportance of barley and rye compared to wheat, particularly later in the eighteenth 
century. This mirrors the declining importance of rye in England in this period. 
 The other arable crops that are potentially important are oats, peas and beans. The 
crop returns gathered by the English from 1806 onwards, which are fairly complete, 
suggest that oats were of very minor importance at the outset of the nineteenth century. In 
1806 oats comprised only 4.0 per cent of the volume of output, and the trend was rapidly 
upwards.29 This suggests that in the eighteenth century the importance of oats was 
probably close to zero. This is supported by two other pieces of evidence. First, the fact 
that oats never appeared in the Opgaaf suggests that the oat crop was not very large – 
otherwise it would have been taxed. Second, the Cape farmers relied a lot on oxen to 
power their farms, rather than horses, and oxen ate grass rather than oats. Hence the 
                                                 
27 Theal, Records, vol. 6, p. 75, p. 248, p. 442; vol. 7, p. 239, p. 477; vol. 8, p. 233; vol. 9, p. 48, p. 299; 
vol. 10, p. 228; vol. 11, p. 51, p. 238, pp. 438-9; vol. 12, pp. 128-9, pp. 414-5; vol. 13, pp. 354-5; vol. 14, 
pp. 246-7; vol. 15, pp. 198-9; vol. 16, pp. 488-9; British Parliamentary Papers, 1836, vol. 46, pp. 638-41, 
pp. 648-9; 1839, vol. 45, pp. 747-7; 1840, vol. 43, pp. 622-3, pp. 630-3; 1844, vol. 46, pp. 405-7, pp. 410-
13; 1857, vol. 40, p. 293, pp. 300-1; Government of the Cape of Good Hope, Blue book for 1874, BB5; 
Government of the Cape of Good Hope, Blue book for 1878, Q8. 
28 I base my analysis on the data in Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 133-4. In the case of wheat, Van 
Duin and Ross, ibid. p. 33, argue that the “Reaped” category excludes seed and on-farm consumption; I 
assume that this is also the case for barley and rye.  
29 Theal, Records, vol. 6, 76. 
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demand for oats was likely to be very limited before the British arrived. Extrapolating the 
oat output data for 1806-23 backwards gives an estimated output of zero in 1803, and I 
assume that it was constant at that level for earlier years. The situation for peas and beans 
is similar to that for oats, with the modification that peas and beans seem to have been 
even less important and the first data do not begin until 1833.30 At that point, peas and 
beans combined accounted for 0.4 per cent of arable acreage. Hence it seems reasonable 
to exclude them from our analysis of the earlier period and assume that the output was 
zero. The sources for the period after 1795 for barley, rye and oats are the same as for 
wheat.31 
 
Figure A3. Estimated gross output of wheat, barley and rye. 
 
 
                                                 
30 BPP 1836, vol.46, pp. 638-41, 648-9. 
31 Note that in 1853 the agricultural returns combined oats and rye, and in 1854-5 they combined barley and 
rye. The combined barley and rye output of 1854 is higher than the barley output of 1853 by 121 381 
bushels; I therefore assume that rye output was 121 381 bushels in every year from 1853 to 1855 and back 
out estimates of oat and barley output accordingly. 
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Table A2. My estimates of the gross output of wheat, barley and rye, 1701-1875 (bu). 
Year Wheat Barley Rye Year Wheat Barley Rye Year Wheat Barley Rye 
1701 48950 3923 17468 1752 204816 32101 7835 1803    
1702 54870 3270 19886 1753 198969 18203 4020 1804    
1703 54275 3071 15619 1754 246935 26850 7341 1805    
1704 47142 3617 14257 1755 185382 23658 9387 1806 410116 203403 62461 
1705 40806 1637 11730 1756 168632 25122 4952 1807 352250 155815 74872 
1706 37638 2985 9598 1757 123869 14645 2996 1808 381709 141926 10869 
1707 47436 2774 13079 1758 208530 25519 6594 1809 595136 158190 13236 
1708 60493 1312 18956 1759 164549 19802 5400 1810 369549 165237 15031 
1709 62122 3349 9170 1760 171557 18956 1770 1811 390580 172283 11183 
1710 113840 5700 2656 1761 210548 22113 2962 1812 514166 196296 5861 
1711 69592 6812 3109 1762 183849 20446 2368 1813 403268 172638 7818 
1712 60279 4709 3138 1763 223883 22098 3726 1814 356289 155546 5288 
1713 65026 3821 3811 1764 136105 19950 2328 1815 553877 210813 12913 
1714 60799 2946 1165 1765 118479 23454 2058 1816 558680 231666 13360 
1715 66701 5525 936 1766 314844 42096 1034 1817 443440 202011 15393 
1716 95463 5311 2633 1767 219745 26243 4434 1818 485764 192547 19982 
1717 105009 7759 2251 1768 205968 22181 1961 1819 529310 202973 18633 
1718 94255 4846 1897 1769 186042 19767 120 1820 574889 259592 23746 
1719 73617 5087 1414 1770 192535 18432 719 1821 295045 208834 23401 
1720 56201 5013 1216 1771 205400 20694 66 1822 249969 250233 30725 
1721 66400 7468 1816 1772 259776 26743 2672 1823 415860 392696 109833 
1722 89706 8167 2220 1773 378401 25224 706 1824    
1723 109498 9701 2960 1774 338592 35362 456 1825    
1724 97098 9278 2056 1775 291850 28598 283 1826    
1725 107699 6196 2198 1776 302292 30946 161 1827    
1726 66020 6396 2474 1777 282325 24725 386 1828    
1727 77857 9472 3362 1778 250427 18700 251 1829    
1728 98723 8953 3699 1779 376079 26134 1608 1830    
1729 111340 9230 7491 1780 332607 24448 733 1831    
1730 97939 16789 7564 1781 305032 25961 389 1832    
1731 89741 10780 7258 1782 238693 24118 0 1833 528147 286197 33432 
1732 126459 12215 12978 1783 262325 21413 0 1834    
1733 145353 11123 6308 1784 223558 19667 306 1835    
1734 133986 13276 5848 1785 230227 19598 0 1836 466299 218409 34258 
1735 146698 13287 5132 1786 155170 20869 0 1837 494280 220534 38464 
1736 131983 11396 5667 1787 287816 82371 327 1838 463691 180847 29907 
1737 112365 9814 9504 1788 482355 64504 3762 1839 395329 203323 32010 
1738 110648 13731 7213 1789 299306 53102 515 1840 443454 244500 36471 
1739 81266 7731 6366 1790 317550 72023 317 1841 471804 295718 46653 
1740 102935 26849 6556 1791 345836 31175 702 1842 592054 271983 61027 
1741 227409 19305 13149 1792 203302 7472 4453     
1742 205314 18476 10314 1793 413812 24950 1891 1847    
1743 146836 15422 7664 1794 326214 20481 2020     
1744 119869 13007 3290 1795 335892 22169 2770 1853 864272 302753 121381 
1745 172716 17050 6473 1796    1854 1012488 302753 121381 
1746 189262 14533 7069 1797    1855 994273 278856 121381 
1747 153174 12391 6725 1798    1856    
1748 144002 15543 4956 1799        
1749 99615 15970 3051 1800    1865 1389766 308318 174071 
1750 106517 16166 5168 1801        
1751 148434 26970 7727 1802    1875 1687936 447992 214260 
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Table A3. My estimates of the gross output of oats, 1803-1875 (bu). 
Year Output Year Output Year Output Year Output Year Output Year Output 
1806 28696 1814 136510 1822 242280 1830  1838 187860 1853 725139 
1807 26856 1815 141131 1823 291439 1831  1839 185759 1854 925235 
1808 74229 1816 140831 1824  1832  1840 167063 1855 2308777 
1809 83864 1817 154825 1825  1833 237012 1841 215006 1856  
1810 95982 1818 153688 1826  1834  1842 286075   
1811 84773 1819 183135 1827  1835    1865 433342 
1812 130316 1820 224838 1828  1836 241186 1847    
1813 108448 1821 210141 1829  1837 211535   1875 918494 
 
Appendix 4. Output prices. Price data are more scarce that quantity data for the Cape 
colony in the eighteenth century, which is rather unusual in historical work. Van Duin 
and Ross give both the values and the quantities for a group of arable exports.32 From this 
it is possible to infer export prices (since the price is simply the value divided by the 
quantity) and this is the approach that I have followed. I have some reservations 
concerning this approach because is often the case that the level of export prices is not a 
good guide to the level of domestic prices, owing to factors such as a systematic price 
differential between locations involved in the export trade and locations where domestic 
consumption occurred. However, there are two points to note in this case. First, virtually 
all wheat in the Cape was sold in Cape Town and virtually all exports went from Cape 
Town; in that sense, the domestic and export markets were intimately linked and prices 
are likely to be the same in the two sectors. Second, export prices are likely to capture 
accurately the trend in prices even if they do not capture accurately the level of domestic 
prices; this is an important property when measuring changes in output and productivity 
over time, one of our main concerns in this paper. 
 There are two other problems with the export price data. The first problem is that 
the export value data (and hence export prices) are available only in the period 1749-93. 
However, a regression of export prices on a time trend reveals no significant trend; I 
therefore simply assume the price was constant before 1749 at the 1749 level. Whilst this 
will induce some error for any particular year, it is probably quite a good guide to prices 
on average. Notice also that the year-on-year variability of export prices is not 
excessively high, with a coefficient of variation of 0.35. The second problem is that we 
have export values only for a composite category called “All Grains and Pulses”. Thus 
the price that I calculate will actually be a mixture of the wheat, barley, rye, pea and bean 
prices. But I am going to use this as my estimate of the price of wheat (the major crop); 
this estimate of the wheat price will be completely accurate only if the price of wheat is 
the same as the prices of the other crops. If the prices of the other crops are higher or 
lower then the estimated wheat price will be biased upwards or downwards accordingly. 
However, whilst this is a problem in theory, it is not a problem in practice because wheat 
was effectively the only crop to be exported.33 For example, pulses (that is, peas and 
beans) constituted only 3.7 per cent of the export category of “All Grains and Pulses” in 
the period 1749-93. Hence any biases will be extremely small.  
 The export data do not give any prices for barley and rye, so I estimate them. The 
first price data that we have are for the period 1833-55. I calculated the ratios of the 
                                                 
32 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 128-9. 
33 Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, pp. 129. 
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barley and rye prices to the wheat price. The ratios have no significant time trend and the 
year-on-year variation is quite low, with a coefficient of variation of only 0.16. Hence I 
simply assume that the price relatives for the eighteenth century were the same as the 
average price relatives for the period 1833-55, and hence I can estimate the absolute 
barley and rye prices from the wheat price. My estimates for each of the price series are 
reported in tables A4 and A5 below.34 
 
Table A4. Prices of wheat, barley and rye (English d/bu). 
Year Wheat Barley Rye Year Wheat Barley Rye Year Wheat Barley Rye 
1749 41 17 20 1789 120 50 58 1829 68 25 28 
1750 47 19 23 1790 39 16 19 1830 69 26 28 
1751 44 18 21 1791 36 15 18 1831 70 26 28 
1752 45 19 22 1792 36 15 18 1832 71 26 29 
1753 45 19 22 1793 36 15 17 1833 72 27 29 
1754 42 17 20 1794 36 15 17 1834 73 27 29 
1755 41 17 20 1795 36 15 17 1835 74 27 30 
1756 41 17 20 1796 36 15 18 1836 75 27.5 30 
1757 40 17 19 1797 37 15 18 1837 93 42 42 
1758 40 16 19 1798 38 16 18 1838 100 54 42 
1759 39 16 19 1799 39 16 19 1839 163 53 56 
1760 40 17 20 1800 40 16 19 1840 103 34 57 
1761 39 16 19 1801 41 17 19 1841 73 29 40 
1762 11 5 6 1802 42 17 20 1842 76 36 35 
1763 40 17 19 1803 43 17 20     
1764 42 18 21 1804 44 18 20 1853 96 48 60 
1765 46 19 22 1805 45 18 20 1854 98 39 53 
1766 40 17 20 1806 46 18 21 1855 90 37 49 
1767 40 17 20 1807 47 19 21 1856 98 42 49 
1768 40 17 20 1808 48 19 21 1857 106 46 49 
1769 40 17 20 1809 49 19 22 1858 113 51 49 
1770 36 15 18 1810 50 19 22 1859 121 56 50 
1771 36 15 18 1811 51 20 22 1860 102 58 76 
1772 36 15 17 1812 52 20 23 1861 120 61 76 
1773 30 13 15 1813 53 20 23 1862 166 70 83 
1774 31 13 15 1814 54 21 23 1863 164 72 87 
1775 30 13 15 1815 55 21 24 1864 162 74 91 
1776 28 12 14 1816 56 21 24 1865 161 76 96 
1777 33 14 16 1817 57 22 24 1866 159 77 100 
1778 36 15 18 1818 58 22 24 1867 157 79 104 
1779 30 13 15 1819 59 22 25 1868 155 81 108 
1780 31 13 15 1820 60 23 25 1869 153 83 112 
1781 30 12 15 1821 61 23 25 1870 151 85 117 
1782 38 16 18 1822 62 23 26 1871 150 87 121 
1783 37 15 18 1823 62 23 26 1872 148 88 125 
1784 36 15 18 1824 63 24 26 1873 146 90 129 
1785 36 15 17 1825 64 24 27 1874 144 92 134 
1786 37 15 18 1826 65 24 27 1875 123 73 100 
1787 39 16 19 1827 66 25 27     
1788 36 15 17 1828 67 25 28     
                                                 
34 Figures in italics in table A3 are estimated by linear interpolation unless otherwise stated. In table A4 the 
prices for oat hay are in d/ton. 
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Table A5. Prices of oats, oat hay, maize/millet, peas/beans, potatoes (English d/bu). 
Year Oats Oat 
hay 
Maize/ 
Millet 
Peas/ 
beans 
Pots. Year Oats Oat 
hay 
Maize/ 
millet 
Peas/ 
beans 
Pots. 
1836 23 32 46 66 37 1853 48  60 48 54 
1837 41 70 52 74 38 1854 50  61 88 51 
1838 54 109 79 91 60 1855 46  58 85 49 
1839 39 106 85 100 61 1859 67  92 121 86 
1840 34 63 53 89 45 1860 70  77 124 71 
1841 26 62 46 79 43 1861 74  81 111 79 
1842 37 65 55 84 47 1862 62  95 132 83 
      1874 119  110 136 103 
 
Appendix 5. Acreages and yields. From 1833 onwards we know the acreage in 
production of each of the major field crops. However, we do not have the acreage of 
fallow land (that is, land that is generally in production but is the resting phase of the crop 
rotation). Fallow land is important because a common way to increase the productivity of 
arable land was to reduce the amount of time that it was left fallow by introducing new 
types of crop. Thus failure to take account of fallow land could lead to errors in the 
measurement of productivity changes over time. Van Duin and Ross suggest that land 
was fallowed for two or three years after taking two grain crops, so I have therefore 
assumed that fallow land constituted 56 per cent (=2.5/4.5) of total acreage. From 1833 
onwards we know also the annual yield of each crop. 
 For the earlier years we know the total output of the major field crops but we do 
not know for any of them either the yield per acre or the acreage in production. However, 
over the period 1833-55 there was no significant increase in crop yields and it seems 
likely that the level of yields was similar in earlier years. I therefore assume that crop 
yields in the period 1701-1823 were the same as the average for 1833-42. Dividing the 
total output in each year by the assumed crop yields generates and estimate of the acreage 
of each crop. I then assume that fallow was 56 per cent of total acreage. 
 The data for yields and total acreage are reported in tables A6 and A7 below. The 
acreages of wheat, barley and rye individually can be calculated by dividing total output 
(to be found in table A1 above) by the individual crop yields. Note that the total arable 
acreage reported below is sometimes greater than the sum of the acreages of wheat, 
barley and rye because it incorporates the acreages of minor field crops such as peas, 
beans and tobacco. Note also that the acreage estimates are excessively volatile. This is 
because the true yield (and therefore the total output) fluctuated a lot from year to year, 
whereas my estimate of the acreage before 1833 is derived by dividing the fluctuating 
output by a constant yield. The acreage estimates are probably fairly accurate when 
averaged over any five-year period, but the estimate for any particular year could be 
significantly out. 
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Table A6. Crop yields per acre (oat hay in lbs, all other crops in bu). 
Year Wheat Barley Rye Oats Maize/ 
millet 
Peas/ 
beans 
Potatoes Oat hay 
1701-1823 6.18 10.01 5.48      
         
1833 4.24 7.04 2.58 4.77 4.02 4.49 13.09 97.50 
1834         
1835         
1836 4.35 6.12 2.52 6.63 16.52 5.20 44.52 123.26 
1837 6.16 7.45 5.80 5.79 8.94 9.41 11.53 95.87 
1838 5.35 6.06 4.07 6.11 14.16 7.54 19.57 115.79 
1839 5.28 9.46 5.78 5.55 10.91 8.56 40.54 194.81 
1840 6.11 11.39 6.77 5.44 17.06 11.55 21.50 116.88 
1841 6.92 12.90 6.55 7.07 15.05 11.80 21.91 235.45 
1842 11.02 19.64 9.76 9.62 10.68 6.22 17.77 297.26 
         
1853 5.61 11.26 7.64 6.63 9.23 4.61 13.73 461.42 
1854 6.26 10.86 7.64 8.40 6.36 5.62 11.48 304.27 
1855 6.35 11.36 7.64 20.13 5.68 5.16 15.39 369.56 
         
1865 6.87 8.92 7.15 4.35 6.50 4.58 14.38 570.85 
         
1875 8.96 15.35 4.99 8.01 8.47 7.46 41.22 817.41 
 
Table A7. Total arable acreage. 
Year TOTAL Year TOTAL  Year TOTAL  Year TOTAL  Year TOTAL  
1701 25879 1728 39478 1755 76673 1782 92333 1818 439681 
1702 28880 1729 45691 1756 69082 1783 100329 1819 483312 
1703 26867 1730 42542 1757 49625 1784 85947 1820 555107 
1704 23833 1731 38080 1758 84373 1785 88234 1821 370559 
1705 20043 1732 54121 1759 66584 1786 61191 1822 381850 
1706 18317 1733 58016 1760 67454 1787 123450 1823 603173 
1707 23266 1734 54172 1761 82850 1788 191677   
1708 30106 1735 58509 1762 72510 1789 121131 1833 810879 
1709 27138 1736 52945 1763 88016 1790 131946 1834  
1710 43822 1737 47023 1764 54998 1791 133219 1835  
1711 28147 1738 46337 1765 49258 1792 77533 1836 679141 
1712 24295 1739 33942 1766 124527 1793 157059 1837 543184 
1713 26101 1740 46209 1767 87732 1794 124212 1838 547991 
1714 23278 1741 92542 1768 80787 1795 128423 1839 486756 
1715 25913 1742 83146 1769 72233   1840 462964 
1716 37035 1743 60079 1770 74543 1806 359090 1841 464486 
1717 40904 1744 47921 1771 79467 1807 316589 1842 377396 
1718 36188 1745 69379 1772 101696 1808 313565   
1719 28529 1746 75082 1773 143740 1809 446936 1853 1187382 
1720 22090 1747 61319 1774 131422 1810 329438 1854 1247299 
1721 26602 1748 57962 1775 112811 1811 335195 1855 1233988 
1722 35411 1749 41114 1776 117091 1812 435218   
1723 43265 1750 44541 1777 108514 1813 353367 1865 1462074 
1724 38285 1751 63283 1778 95490 1814 334583   
1725 41510 1752 85010 1779 143470 1815 473239 1875 1792570 
1726 26492 1753 78190 1780 126903 1816 483368   
1727 31859 1754 98962 1781 117062 1817 416714   
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